AML.T0000.003 · Scan Databases

Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0000.003 · Scan Databases in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may search public internet-scan services to identify a victim's exposed AI infrastructure. These services, such as Shodan and Censys, continuously scan the internet and publish the active IP addresses, hostnames, open ports, and service banners, which adversaries can query without interacting with the target directly. Information gathered this way may also reveal candidates for follow-on [Active Scanning](/techniques/AML.T0006) to confirm that services remain reachable, to probe for misconfigurations or unauthorized endpoints. It may also inform later initial access attempts such as [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/techniques/AML.T0049). Unlike [Active Scanning](/techniques/AML.T0006), this technique relies on third-party scan data and involves no direct interaction with the victim system.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Incident ·

Threat Actor Uses a DeepSeek-Powered Hermes Agent in Langflow and n8n Exploitation Attempts

A Chinese-speaking threat actor operating as knaithe or KnYuan configured Hermes Agent to use DeepSeek as its reasoning engine. Hermes supplied terminal access, Telegram-based operator control, and a skills system containing both bundled and actor-created red-team skills. The actor also integrated an MCP server that exposed FOFA search, query translation, and Nuclei scan-generation capabilities. Unit 42 recovered a detailed Hermes Agent session dated May 7, 2026. The actor supplied an initial task through Telegram, but Unit 42 recovered no additional operator input during the session. The DeepSeek-powered Hermes Agent then autonomously searched for targets, obtained public exploits, ran scans, evaluated the results, and revised its approach. The agent initially targeted Langflow using a public exploit for CVE-2026-33017. After determining that available targets lacked the exploit's prerequisites, it abandoned that path, compared vulnerabilities across 10 product families, and selected n8n based on apparent severity, exposure, and exploitability. It then obtained a public exploit chain for CVE-2026-21858 and CVE-2025-68613 and probed candidate systems identified through FOFA. Although several systems appeared to run affected versions, the agent found that they lacked the required unauthenticated file-upload functionality. None of the autonomous exploitation attempts obtained access. Separate workspace evidence documented manual actor activity involving Citrix NetScaler data extraction, Marimo command execution, and reverse-shell attempts against Tomcat and IKE VPN systems. Unit 42 obtained this visibility after Hermes Agent responded to a Telegram command by starting an HTTP file server from the actor's home directory, /home/worker, instead of an isolated staging directory. This unintentionally exposed the actor's workspace, including AI tool configurations, API keys, exploit scripts, target lists, Bash history, and autonomous exploitation session logs.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Exposed ClawdBot Control Interfaces Leads to Credential Access and Execution

A security researcher identified hundreds of exposed ClawdBot control interfaces on the public internet. ClawdBot (now OpenClaw) "is a personal AI assistant you run on your own devices. It answers you on the channels you already use ... , plus extension channels. ... It can speak and listen on macOS/iOS/Android, and can render a live Canvas you control." The researcher was able to access credentials to a variety of connected applications via ClawdBot's configuration file. They were also able to invoke ClawdBot's skills by prompting it via the chat interface, leading to root access in the container. The researcher searched Shodan to identify Clawdbot instances exposed on the public internet, some without authentication enabled. The researcher demonstrated that the ClawdBot's authentication mechanism could be bypassed due to a proxy misconfiguration. With access to ClawdBot's control interface, they were then able to access ClawdBot's configuration, which contained credentials to a variety of other services. Across various exposed instances of ClawdBot, they identified Anthropic API Keys, Telegram Bot Tokens, Slack Oauth Credentials, and Signal Device Linking URIs. The researcher prompted ClawdBot directly via the chat interface, which led to exposure of its system prompt. They were also able to get ClawdBot to execute commands via its bash skill, which at least in at least one instance led to root access in the ClawdBot container. The researcher noted a broad range of other impacts they could have had with this level of access, including: - Manipulation of user chat history with the ClawdBot AI agent - Exfiltration of conversation histories of any connected messaging services - Impersonation of users by sending messages on their behalf via connected messaging services

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗