AML.T0001 · Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis

Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0001 · Search Open AI Vulnerability Analysis in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Much like the [Search Open Technical Databases](/techniques/AML.T0000), there is often ample research available on the vulnerabilities of common AI models. Once a target has been identified, an adversary will likely try to identify any pre-existing work that has been done for this class of models. This will include not only reading academic papers that may identify the particulars of a successful attack, but also identifying pre-existing implementations of those attacks. The adversary may obtain [Adversarial AI Attack Implementations](/techniques/AML.T0016.000) or develop their own [Adversarial AI Attacks](/techniques/AML.T0017.000) if necessary.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

Achieving Code Execution in MathGPT via Prompt Injection

The publicly available Streamlit application MathGPT (https://mathgpt.streamlit.app/) uses GPT-3, a large language model (LLM), to answer user-generated math questions. Recent studies and experiments have shown that LLMs such as GPT-3 show poor performance when it comes to performing exact math directly. However, they can produce more accurate answers when asked to generate executable code that solves the question at hand. In the MathGPT application, GPT-3 is used to convert the user's natural language question into Python code that is then executed. After computation, the executed code and the answer are displayed to the user. Some LLMs can be vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious user inputs cause the models to perform unexpected behavior. In this incident, the actor explored several prompt-override avenues, producing code that eventually led to the actor gaining access to the application host system's environment variables and the application's GPT-3 API key, as well as executing a denial of service attack. As a result, the actor could have exhausted the application's API query budget or brought down the application. After disclosing the attack vectors and their results to the MathGPT and Streamlit teams, the teams took steps to mitigate the vulnerabilities, filtering on select prompts and rotating the API key.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Confusing Antimalware Neural Networks

Cloud storage and computations have become popular platforms for deploying ML malware detectors. In such cases, the features for models are built on users' systems and then sent to cybersecurity company servers. The Kaspersky ML research team explored this gray-box scenario and showed that feature knowledge is enough for an adversarial attack on ML models. They attacked one of Kaspersky's antimalware ML models without white-box access to it and successfully evaded detection for most of the adversarially modified malware files.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗