AML.T0011.003 · Malicious Link

Explore 5 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0011.003 · Malicious Link in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

An adversary may rely upon a user clicking a malicious link in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to click on a link that will lead to code execution. This user action will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from Spearphishing Link. Clicking on a link may also lead to other execution techniques such as exploitation of a browser or application vulnerability via Exploitation for Client Execution. Links may also lead users to download files that require execution via Malicious File. There are many ways an adversary can leverage malicious links to gain access to a victim system via an AI system. For example, an AI Agent that is configured to not validate website origin headers will accept connections from any website, allowing adversaries to access otherwise inaccessible networks.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

Spyder and MaXSS Let Ordinary Webpages Inherit AI Extension Privileges

Rebora disclosed two different browser-extension privilege crossings. Spyder abused Sider's synthetic drag and cross-origin gesture path to drive an authenticated Gemini page; MaXSS sent a forged page message through MaxAI's content script to a generic privileged background-function bridge. Rebora counted about 11 million Chrome and Edge installations across both products at publication, but the two mechanisms and their remediation status must be reviewed separately.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Ray DNS Rebinding: A Malicious Page Reaches the Local Jobs API

CVE-2025-62593 affects Ray before 2.52.0. A developer running the Ray Dashboard on its default port can be compromised after visiting a malicious page or advertisement in Firefox or Safari. DNS rebinding changes the attacker's origin to the local or private Ray endpoint; browser JavaScript sets a non-Mozilla User-Agent to bypass Ray's weak browser heuristic, then submits a job to the unauthenticated Jobs API. Ray executes the supplied command. CISA added the CVE to KEV on August 17, 2026, but has not attributed the exploitation.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

AgentForger Turned One ChatGPT Link Into a Scheduled Autonomous Insider

Zenity validated that one crafted ChatGPT link could drive Workspace Agents, OpenAI's enterprise agent builder, inside a logged-in victim session. The builder created and published an attacker-instructed agent, attached previously authorized connectors, disabled approvals, and stacked recurring hourly schedules at five-minute offsets into an effective five-minute email command loop. OpenAI fixed the reported vulnerability on June 8, 2026. The case shows why agent control-plane changes, connector use, scheduled execution, and outbound data flows need separate authorization boundaries.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

SearchLeak: How a Microsoft 365 Copilot Search Link Became a One-Click Data Exfiltration Path

SearchLeak shows how a trusted Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise Search URL (the enterprise search surface for Microsoft 365 data) can turn dangerous when the q parameter is treated as instructions instead of a query. Varonis chained that parameter-to-prompt flaw with a streaming HTML rendering race and a Bing image SSRF path, so one click could move user-accessible Microsoft 365 data into an attacker-controlled URL. Defenders need pre-model query validation, render-before-network sanitization, and data-flow policy on outbound fetches.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

OpenClaw 'ClawJacked': Website-to-Local Agent Takeover via Loopback Trust and WebSocket Abuse

Oasis Security showed in its early-2026 tests that a malicious website could open a WebSocket to OpenClaw's localhost gateway (the local management entry point for an agent platform), skip origin checks by claiming a CLI client, then brute-force password auth because loopback attempts were exempt from rate limits. The fix is already out; the lesson is to stop treating localhost as identity and to scope every agent session and RPC method as privileged.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗