Explore 7 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0011 · User Execution in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
An adversary may rely upon a user to load, execute, interpret, or otherwise use a malicious or unsafe artifact. In AI systems, user execution may include loading a model or causing an inference runtime to process executable or behavior-shaping components bundled with an AI artifact. The resulting effect may include host code execution or malicious AI behavior. Users may inadvertently execute unsafe code introduced via [AI Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/AML.T0010). Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link.
During AISI cyber testing in July 2026, agents with Internet access and disabled cyber classifiers took unsanctioned actions outside the range. A malicious pull request was rejected; prompt-injection attempts did not establish assistant ingestion. An investigator deliberately executed one payload in a Docker container, while other payloads ran in Dependabot processing containers without reported host escape. Separate runs reused a publicly exposed GitHub token. The 42 procedures preserve these connected branches and their different outcomes.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Google Colab is a Jupyter Notebook service that executes on virtual machines. Jupyter Notebooks are often used for ML and data science research and experimentation, containing executable snippets of Python code and common Unix command-line functionality. In addition to data manipulation and visualization, this code execution functionality can allow users to download arbitrary files from the internet, manipulate files on the virtual machine, and so on. Users can also share Jupyter Notebooks with other users via links. In the case of notebooks with malicious code, users may unknowingly execute the offending code, which may be obfuscated or hidden in a downloaded script, for example. When a user opens a shared Jupyter Notebook in Colab, they are asked whether they'd like to allow the notebook to access their Google Drive. While there can be legitimate reasons for allowing Google Drive access, such as to allow a user to substitute their own files, there can also be malicious effects such as data exfiltration or opening a server to the victim's Google Drive. This exercise raises awareness of the effects of arbitrary code execution and Colab's Google Drive integration. Practice secure evaluations of shared Colab notebook links and examine code prior to execution.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Cybernews researchers demonstrated that Lenovo's AI chatbot "Lena" was vulnerable to a prompt injection that produced malicious HTML which was saved in the chat history and could exfiltrate a human support agent's session cookie when rendered in their browser. The researchers prompted Lena with a benign-looking product information request that included instructions to respond with a dangerous HTML payload. The response was saved in the user's chat history, creating a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) payload. When the researchers requested transfer to a human support agent, the agent's normal workflow of opening the chat transcript caused the poisoned content to render, exfiltrating session cookie data to an attacker-controlled server. If a valid support agent cookie were reused, an adversary could potentially access Lenovo's customer support platform as that agent and view customer conversations or perform other actions available to the account. Lenovo acknowledged the issue and reported implementing corrective actions to mitigate the potential impact and address the issue.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
On June 5, 2026, a previously compromised contributor account pushed commit 5f456b8 to Azure/durabletask. The commit added four repository-local trigger files and a 4.6 MB obfuscated .github/setup.js credential harvester. Opening the project could launch that payload through Claude Code or Gemini CLI SessionStart hooks, a Cursor always-applied rule, or a VS Code folder-open task. GitHub later disabled 73 repositories across four Microsoft organizations in a 105-second automated sweep; that number describes containment scope, not proof that all 73 repositories contained the malicious commit.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
In July 2025, Ukrainian authorities reported the emergence of LAMEHUG, a new AI-powered malware attributed to the Russian state-backed threat actor APT28 (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/) (also tracked as Forest Blizzard or UAC-0001). LAMEHUG uses a large language model (LLM) to dynamically generate commands on the infected hosts. The campaign began with a phishing attack leveraging a compromised government email account to deliver a malicious ZIP archive disguised as Appendix.pdf.zip. The archive contained the LAMEHUG malware, a Python-based executable, packed with PyInstaller. When executed, the malware makes calls to an LLM endpoint to generate malicious commands from natural language prompts. Dynamically generated commands may make the malware harder to detect. LAMEHUG was configured to collect files from the local system and exfiltrate them.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
0DIN showed a clean-looking repository that steers Claude Code-style agents (AI coding agents that can inspect projects and run developer commands) into running setup logic that fetches payload material from DNS TXT records. The case is valuable because the malicious step does not need to live plainly in the repository. Defenders need sandboxed dependency installation, command approval, egress controls, and pre-execution scanning for runtime-fetched code.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Zafran's DifyTap research combined unauthenticated conversation exposure, Plugin Daemon (Dify's plugin service) access paths, cross-tenant document preview risks, and a PDF preview parser issue in Dify (a platform for building multi-tenant AI applications). The strongest defensive lesson is not a single patch: multi-tenant AI platforms need object-level authorization, tenant-state isolation, telemetry redaction, and sandboxed document handling at every lifecycle boundary.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.