Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0016 · Obtain Capabilities in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may search for and obtain software capabilities for use in their operations. Capabilities may be specific to AI-based attacks [Adversarial AI Attack Implementations](/techniques/AML.T0016.000) or generic software tools repurposed for malicious intent ([Software Tools](/techniques/AML.T0016.001)). In both instances, an adversary may modify or customize the capability to aid in targeting a particular AI-enabled system.
Facial biometric authentication services are commonly used by mobile applications for user onboarding, authentication, and identity verification for KYC requirements. The iProov Red Team demonstrated a face-swapped imagery injection attack that can successfully evade live facial recognition authentication models along with both passive and active liveness verification (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liveness_test) on mobile devices. By executing this kind of attack, adversaries could gain access to privileged systems of a victim or create fake personas to create fake accounts on banking or cryptocurrency apps.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Microsoft found companies using AI summary links to plant promotional instructions in assistants with persistent memory, a feature that retains preferences across conversations. If accepted and later recalled, those instructions can influence recommendations long after the original page is closed. The defensive priority is to keep website-authored requests from silently becoming trusted user preferences.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.