Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0024 · Exfiltration via AI Inference API in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may exfiltrate private information via [AI Model Inference API Access](/techniques/AML.T0040). AI Models have been shown leak private information about their training data (e.g. [Infer Training Data Membership](/techniques/AML.T0024.000), [Invert AI Model](/techniques/AML.T0024.001)). The model itself may also be extracted ([Extract AI Model](/techniques/AML.T0024.002)) for the purposes of [AI Intellectual Property Theft](/techniques/AML.T0048.004). Exfiltration of information relating to private training data raises privacy concerns. Private training data may include personally identifiable information, or other protected data.
NSA, CISA and FBI attributed coordinated distillation campaigns to six China-based AI companies. Their September 2026 advisory describes fraudulent accounts, bulk subscriptions, gray-market proxies, cross-provider routing, request-metadata removal and hidden-reasoning prompts, followed by response collection and quality checks. Distillation trains a model from another model’s outputs; the advisory’s attribution and capability-assessment claims are attributed to the agencies, not presented as independently reproduced measurements or model-weight theft.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Google reported campaigns that used compromised credentials, fraudulent accounts and proxies to collect model outputs for distillation: training another model from a provider’s responses. A February 2026 reasoning-focused campaign exceeded 100,000 prompts; later campaigns included some above 100 million. Those are campaign query volumes, not model weights stolen or a measured replication success rate. Google says it disrupted accounts and reduced the usefulness of collected outputs.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Anthropic attributed more than 16 million exchanges through roughly 24,000 fraudulent accounts to DeepSeek, Moonshot AI and MiniMax. The flow distinguishes proxy access, authenticated accounts, distributed routing, inference-response collection and downstream model training. Provider-side hunting and verified limits act before outputs leave; potential harms from models lacking safeguards remain Anthropic’s risk assessment, not observed downstream victim counts.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.