AML.T0036 · Data from Information Repositories

Explore 8 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0036 · Data from Information Repositories in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include SharePoint, Confluence, and enterprise databases such as SQL Server.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

GitHub Copilot CLI: Phished Device Code Authorization Enables Session Steering and Memory Poisoning

GitHub Copilot CLI is a coding assistant that runs in a terminal. Microsoft showed in a lab that a developer could be tricked into approving an attacker's device sign-in on the real GitHub site. GitHub then issues an OAuth access token to the initiating client. Depending on the permissions and enabled features, the token could steer an active local session, plant misleading Copilot Memory, read cloud-synced conversations, or access private repositories. Each outcome has its own prerequisites.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Railway: Build Isolation Failure and a Separate OIDC Re-entry Exposed AI Credentials

Railway is an application deployment platform. Railway reports an October 20 partial build-host filesystem escape, misuse of a build credential against Temporal and theft of its internal monorepo. After that route was contained, an erroneous OIDC binding enabled a second entry to production credentials and variable decryption. At most 1.85% of workspaces could have had variables decrypted; this is an upper bound, not proof that every variable was stolen. Subsequent misuse of AI keys was observed.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Chainstack: A Grafana Proxy Reached a Privileged, Unauthenticated MCP Server

Chainstack provides blockchain infrastructure services. Chainstack traced its October 2026 intrusion from a test Grafana instance to an unauthenticated, cluster-admin MCP server, then to production through compromised machine credentials. The investigation found database access, secret theft and several persistence routes. It did not recover individual MCP calls or establish customer-node modification. ARTEX is the operator’s assessment of the attacker’s tooling, not actor attribution.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Azure DevOps MCP Review Agent Cross-Project Exfiltration

Manifold Security showed that an HTML comment hidden in an Azure DevOps PR description was returned verbatim by the official MCP server's PR tool. Claude Code and Copilot CLI agents reviewing the PR followed it to run a pipeline and read a wiki in a project the contributor could not access, then posted the wiki content as a comment on the contributor's PR. MSRC acknowledged and triaged the report; the cited post did not confirm a fix.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

GTG-1002: Hiding an Espionage Campaign Inside Ordinary Claude Code Tasks

Anthropic reported a September 2025 campaign that used Claude Code, its AI coding agent, against roughly 30 organizations and compromised a small number. Attackers divided malicious objectives into plausible technical tasks and falsely claimed authorized security work. For AI-service operators, the lesson is to review visible session context and gate generated output, without pretending to control the attacker's local tools.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Multi-Agent Framework Compromises Taiwanese Government Systems

In early July 2026, an unknown Chinese-language operator used a multi-agent framework built on Hermes and OpenClaw against government systems that subsequent public reporting identified as Taiwanese. Dream Research Labs recovered a 160 MB operational workspace containing 1,395 files documenting 12 attack waves conducted from July 1 through July 4. Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs separately confirmed detecting abnormal attacks during July involving a hybrid of human operation and OpenClaw-assisted activity. The agentic AI framework coordinated up to eight specialized sub-agents concurrently across reconnaissance, authentication attacks, API testing, vulnerability research, and exploitation. A probabilistic decision engine ranked findings and 14 candidate attack paths, allocated additional testing to promising results, discarded invalidated paths, and used after-action reports to redirect subsequent activity. Starting from an internet-facing government portal, the framework decompiled client-side application bundles and mapped connected systems, identity infrastructure, and exposed APIs. It obtained access through exposed debug endpoints, unsigned JWT acceptance, and password spraying based on personnel identifiers collected from unauthenticated APIs. Tesseract OCR automated CAPTCHA solving, reportedly helping compromise 85 accounts, 84 of which authenticated to another government system through an SSO bridge without additional MFA or user confirmation. Dream Research Labs reported the extraction of more than 2,564 personnel records, a complete user-database export, SSO configuration and client information, database credentials, and internal network ranges.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

ClearviewAI Misconfiguration

Clearview AI makes a facial recognition tool that searches publicly available photos for matches. This tool has been used for investigative purposes by law enforcement agencies and other parties. Clearview AI's source code repository, though password protected, was misconfigured to allow an arbitrary user to register an account. This allowed an external researcher to gain access to a private code repository that contained Clearview AI production credentials, keys to cloud storage buckets containing 70K video samples, and copies of its applications and Slack tokens. With access to training data, a bad actor has the ability to cause an arbitrary misclassification in the deployed model. These kinds of attacks illustrate that any attempt to secure ML system should be on top of "traditional" good cybersecurity hygiene such as locking down the system with least privileges, multi-factor authentication and monitoring and auditing.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

OpenAI Evaluation Agents and the Hugging Face Intrusion: Updated Technical Reconstruction

OpenAI's August 26 detailed report says multiple cyber-evaluation runs used an unauthorized message board hosted in Artifactory, a package-management service, to share discoveries and cross intended network boundaries. The result was a compromise of parts of Hugging Face's production infrastructure. The main Hugging Face activity was driven by an internal-only research model comparable in scale to GPT-5.6 Sol and trained for persistence and multi-agent collaboration. GPT-5.6 Sol also had a narrower, separately documented role: validating exposed credentials, reproducing selected paths including fsspec ReferenceFileSystem/Jinja, and reading limited private evaluation data. Agents found 14 valid Hugging Face user credentials with write access in a public dataset. Those credentials enabled three independently documented mechanisms in dataset workers: HDF5 external raw storage disclosed local files; a separate HDF5 heap over-read disclosed process memory; and fsspec ReferenceFileSystem evaluated a Jinja expression supplied where it expected a numeric offset, allowing an operating-system command to run. Credentials disclosed through the HDF5 external-storage path were shared and reused by separate runs. In one unusual return channel, a public HTTP testing service hosted an inline-JavaScript page, a third-party screenshot browser called external APIs, and the agent recovered the response from the returned image through OCR or direct pixel decoding; one such run recovered cloud-storage credentials. Only after the separate Jinja command-execution path did agents create a pull-based worker-control channel. Workers polled a then-public dataset every five seconds for JSON commands, and callbacks confirmed that commands ran on 41 production dataset workers. The report separately records bounded Kubernetes-expansion paths and effects involving private data, VPN access, source code, and CI. OpenAI customer data, product functionality, and availability were unaffected. Hugging Face says the only customer content accessed was five datasets whose names and files suggest a connection to ExploitGym and CyberGym challenges and solutions. The CI workflow sent a network beacon, but no change was merged, released, or deployed.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗