AML.T0040 · AI Model Inference API Access

Explore 14 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0040 · AI Model Inference API Access in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may gain access to a model via legitimate access to the inference API. Inference API access can be a source of information to the adversary ([Discover AI Model Ontology](/techniques/AML.T0013), [Discover AI Model Family](/techniques/AML.T0014)), a means of staging the attack ([Verify Attack](/techniques/AML.T0042), [Craft Adversarial Data](/techniques/AML.T0043)), or for introducing data to the target system for Impact ([Evade AI Model](/techniques/AML.T0015), [Erode AI Model Integrity](/techniques/AML.T0031)). Many systems rely on the same models provided via an inference API, which means they share the same vulnerabilities. This is especially true of foundation models which are prohibitively resource intensive to train. Adversaries may use their access to model APIs to identify vulnerabilities such as jailbreaks or hallucinations and then target applications that use the same models.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

LiteLLM CVE-2026-89032: Broken Semantic-Cache Isolation Enables Cross-User Leaks and Tool-Call Poisoning

LiteLLM is a gateway that routes applications' requests to language models. Its semantic cache can reuse an earlier answer when two questions have similar meanings. NVISO showed that in the tested configuration, /v1/responses reused cached entries across different API keys. This exposed simulated support data and allowed a fabricated answer or tool-call response to reach a different user. The researchers also demonstrated downstream execution in a mock banking tool and the pi coding agent. CVE-2026-89032 was fixed in v1.101.0-rc.1.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

GTIG / Mandiant: Multi-Cloud LLMJacking and "LLM Mixer" Monetization

Google Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant reported LLMJacking across several 2026 investigations: actors used other organizations' credentials to run cloud language models at the victims' expense. Some incidents incurred more than US$100,000 in a day. A separate token-routing service handled over 500,000 calls in less than eight hours, passing nearly US$1 million in costs to one victim. The investigations show several routes into cloud or AI gateways and different ways to cash out. For LiteLLM operators, v1.83.14-stable includes the fix for the cited CVE but still lacks the key ownership-change check added in v1.84.0.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Morris II Worm: RAG-Based Attack

Morris II is a constructed research demonstration in which a RAG email assistant retrieves a malicious message, copies its instructions into a generated reply and includes sensitive correspondence data. The automatic email workflow then sends that response onward. The graph separates source delivery, corpus storage, retrieved instruction following, generated content and the two security effects of sending it; the branches do not imply two independently observed emails or a real-world victim campaign.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Threat Actor Uses a DeepSeek-Powered Hermes Agent in Langflow and n8n Exploitation Attempts

A Chinese-speaking threat actor operating as knaithe or KnYuan configured Hermes Agent to use DeepSeek as its reasoning engine. Hermes supplied terminal access, Telegram-based operator control, and a skills system containing both bundled and actor-created red-team skills. The actor also integrated an MCP server that exposed FOFA search, query translation, and Nuclei scan-generation capabilities. Unit 42 recovered a detailed Hermes Agent session dated May 7, 2026. The actor supplied an initial task through Telegram, but Unit 42 recovered no additional operator input during the session. The DeepSeek-powered Hermes Agent then autonomously searched for targets, obtained public exploits, ran scans, evaluated the results, and revised its approach. The agent initially targeted Langflow using a public exploit for CVE-2026-33017. After determining that available targets lacked the exploit's prerequisites, it abandoned that path, compared vulnerabilities across 10 product families, and selected n8n based on apparent severity, exposure, and exploitability. It then obtained a public exploit chain for CVE-2026-21858 and CVE-2025-68613 and probed candidate systems identified through FOFA. Although several systems appeared to run affected versions, the agent found that they lacked the required unauthenticated file-upload functionality. None of the autonomous exploitation attempts obtained access. Separate workspace evidence documented manual actor activity involving Citrix NetScaler data extraction, Marimo command execution, and reverse-shell attempts against Tomcat and IKE VPN systems. Unit 42 obtained this visibility after Hermes Agent responded to a Telegram command by starting an HTTP file server from the actor's home directory, /home/worker, instead of an isolated staging directory. This unintentionally exposed the actor's workspace, including AI tool configurations, API keys, exploit scripts, target lists, Bash history, and autonomous exploitation session logs.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

GTG-1002: Hiding an Espionage Campaign Inside Ordinary Claude Code Tasks

Anthropic reported a September 2025 campaign that used Claude Code, its AI coding agent, against roughly 30 organizations and compromised a small number. Attackers divided malicious objectives into plausible technical tasks and falsely claimed authorized security work. For AI-service operators, the lesson is to review visible session context and gate generated output, without pretending to control the attacker's local tools.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Rogue Agent: One Dialogflow CX Permission Crossed a Shared Project Runtime

Varonis showed that update rights on one Dialogflow CX agent could be converted into persistent control of a Google-managed Cloud Run execution environment shared by other agents in the project. A Playbook Code Block overwrote code_execution_env.py , after which the modified runtime could intercept conversations, alter live replies, exfiltrate data, and query instance metadata. Google fully remediated the affected components in June 2026.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Stolen Thoughts: Opaque Reasoning Blocks Could Be Replayed to Recover Secrets

Stolen Thoughts found that opaque reasoning blocks returned by Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google APIs could be accepted across sessions, users, or compatible models within a provider family. An attacker who first obtained another user's block could submit it to a weaker compatible model and jailbreak that model into transcribing hidden reasoning. In 6,708 public agent trajectories, the researchers reconstructed 315,320 blocks and found real sensitive artifacts in 328 sessions. They report that provider mitigations later made the demonstrated attacks non-reproducible.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Storm-2139 Azure OpenAI Guardrail Bypass

Storm-2139 built custom jailbreak tooling to bypass guardrails on Azure OpenAI Services, allowing users to generate harmful synthetic content. Microsoft reported that members of Storm-2139 scraped exposed customer credentials from public sources and used them to access accounts for generative AI services. The group developed and operated tools and services that bypassed safety safeguards, modified service capabilities, and enabled end users to generate harmful and illicit content, including non-consensual intimate images of celebrities and other sexually explicit content. The operation included creators who developed illicit tools, providers who modified and supplied those tools, and users who generated prohibited content. Microsoft pursued civil legal action.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Face Identification System Evasion via Physical Countermeasures

MITRE's AI Red Team demonstrated a physical-domain evasion attack on a commercial face identification service with the intention of inducing a targeted misclassification. This operation had a combination of traditional MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as finding valid accounts and executing code via an API - all interleaved with adversarial ML specific attacks.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Research ·

ChatGPT Package Hallucination

Researchers identified that large language models such as ChatGPT can hallucinate fake software package names that are not published to a package repository. An attacker could publish a malicious package under the hallucinated name to a package repository. Then users of the same or similar large language models may encounter the same hallucination and ultimately download and execute the malicious package leading to a variety of potential harms.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Microsoft Edge AI Evasion

The Azure Red Team performed a red team exercise on a new Microsoft product designed for running AI workloads at the edge. This exercise was meant to use an automated system to continuously manipulate a target image to cause the ML model to produce misclassifications.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Microsoft Azure Service Disruption

The Microsoft AI Red Team performed a red team exercise on an internal Azure service with the intention of disrupting its service. This operation had a combination of traditional ATT&CK enterprise techniques such as finding valid account, and exfiltrating data -- all interleaved with adversarial ML specific steps such as offline and online evasion examples.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Moltbook Shows How Agent Social Feeds Can Become a Global Callback Surface

Zenity used coordinated Moltbook posts (agent-facing social-feed content) to make more than 1,000 agent endpoints connected to OpenClaw (an agent platform) fetch a benign controlled link in under a week. This is not a destructive exploit, but it is a strong warning: agent social content is not just content. If agents can ingest it and act on it, it becomes an execution and egress surface.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Exposed LLM Backends Are Becoming Attacker AI Compute

Zenity's honeypots saw operators point autonomous agents and LLM clients at exposed Ollama (a local LLM serving runtime) and LiteLLM (an AI gateway for routing LLM requests) backends. The defender's model server did not have to be exploited with malware; being reachable, unauthenticated, or protected only by a placeholder key was enough to turn it into attacker-funded inference infrastructure.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗