AML.T0043.001 · Black-Box Optimization

Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0043.001 · Black-Box Optimization in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

In Black-Box attacks, the adversary has black-box (i.e. [AI Model Inference API Access](/techniques/AML.T0040) via API access) access to the target model. With black-box attacks, the adversary may be using an API that the victim is monitoring. These attacks are generally less effective and require more inferences than [White-Box Optimization](/techniques/AML.T0043.000) attacks, but they require much less access.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Exercise ·

Microsoft Edge AI Evasion

The Azure Red Team performed a red team exercise on a new Microsoft product designed for running AI workloads at the edge. This exercise was meant to use an automated system to continuously manipulate a target image to cause the ML model to produce misclassifications.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Botnet Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) Detection Evasion

The Palo Alto Networks Security AI research team was able to bypass a Convolutional Neural Network based botnet Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) detector using a generic domain name mutation technique. It is a generic domain mutation technique which can evade most ML-based DGA detection modules. The generic mutation technique evades most ML-based DGA detection modules and can be used to test the effectiveness and robustness of all DGA detection methods developed by security companies in the industry before they are deployed to the production environment.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗