Explore 14 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0048.003 · User Harm in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
User harms may encompass a variety of harm types including financial and reputational that are directed at or felt by individual victims of the attack rather than at the organization level.
SafeBreach demonstrated indirect prompt injection through Calendar invitations and email in Gemini web and Android applications. Retrieved instructions could immediately alter replies or invoke Calendar actions. Other routes retained instructions in conversation history and used a later victim interaction to invoke Google Home, open a website, or launch Zoom. In the Gmail exfiltration route, the initial reply first assembled a source URL containing another email subject; a later interaction opened that existing URL. These are distinct controlled demonstrations, not a single path requiring every impact or a confirmed malicious campaign.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Anthropic attributed more than 16 million exchanges through roughly 24,000 fraudulent accounts to DeepSeek, Moonshot AI and MiniMax. The flow distinguishes proxy access, authenticated accounts, distributed routing, inference-response collection and downstream model training. Provider-side hunting and verified limits act before outputs leave; potential harms from models lacking safeguards remain Anthropic’s risk assessment, not observed downstream victim counts.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Researchers at Invariant Labs demonstrated that AI agents configured with remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) Tools can be vulnerable to model poisoning attacks. They show that an MCP Tool can contain malicious prompts in its docstring description, which is ingested into the AI agent's context, modifying its behavior. They demonstrate this attack with a proof-of-concept MCP Tool that instructs the agent to perform additional actions before using the tool. The agent is instructed to read files containing credentials from the victim's machine and store their contents in one of the input variables to the tool. When the tool runs, the victim's credentials are exfiltrated to the poisoned MCP server.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Researchers showed that poisoned AI coding-assistant rules can hide Unicode instructions, pose as company policy and cause malicious script references to appear in generated HTML without disclosure. The graph also distinguishes inheritance through project forks or templates from execution in the original project. That propagation branch copies an existing rules file; it is not evidence of an agent generating and sending a self-replicating prompt.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Researchers at Lumia have demonstrated that it is possible to extract authentication tokens from the memory of LLM Desktop Applications. An attacker could then use those tokens to impersonate the victim to the LLM backend, thereby gaining access to the victim's conversations as well as the ability to interfere in future conversations. The attacker's access would allow them the ability to directly inject prompts to change the LLM's behavior, poison the LLM's context to have persistent effects, manipulate the user's conversation history to cover their tracks, and ultimately impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. The researchers demonstrated this on Anthropic Claude, Microsoft M365 Copilot, and OpenAI ChatGPT. Vendor Responses to Responsible Disclosure: - Anthropic (HackerOne) - Closed as informational since local attack. - Microsoft Security Response Center - Attack doesn't bypass security boundaries for CVE. - OpenAI (BugCrowd) - Closed as informational and noted that it's up to Microsoft to patch this behavior.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Morris II is a constructed research demonstration in which a RAG email assistant retrieves a malicious message, copies its instructions into a generated reply and includes sensitive correspondence data. The automatic email workflow then sends that response onward. The graph separates source delivery, corpus storage, retrieved instruction following, generated content and the two security effects of sending it; the branches do not imply two independently observed emails or a real-world victim campaign.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
A security researcher identified hundreds of exposed ClawdBot control interfaces on the public internet. ClawdBot (now OpenClaw) "is a personal AI assistant you run on your own devices. It answers you on the channels you already use ... , plus extension channels. ... It can speak and listen on macOS/iOS/Android, and can render a live Canvas you control." The researcher was able to access credentials to a variety of connected applications via ClawdBot's configuration file. They were also able to invoke ClawdBot's skills by prompting it via the chat interface, leading to root access in the container. The researcher searched Shodan to identify Clawdbot instances exposed on the public internet, some without authentication enabled. The researcher demonstrated that the ClawdBot's authentication mechanism could be bypassed due to a proxy misconfiguration. With access to ClawdBot's control interface, they were then able to access ClawdBot's configuration, which contained credentials to a variety of other services. Across various exposed instances of ClawdBot, they identified Anthropic API Keys, Telegram Bot Tokens, Slack Oauth Credentials, and Signal Device Linking URIs. The researcher prompted ClawdBot directly via the chat interface, which led to exposure of its system prompt. They were also able to get ClawdBot to execute commands via its bash skill, which at least in at least one instance led to root access in the ClawdBot container. The researcher noted a broad range of other impacts they could have had with this level of access, including: - Manipulation of user chat history with the ClawdBot AI agent - Exfiltration of conversation histories of any connected messaging services - Impersonation of users by sending messages on their behalf via connected messaging services
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Researchers from Pillar Security and Fujitsu showed that a GGUF artifact can carry a modified Jinja chat template while its model weights remain unchanged. When a trigger appears, the inference engine renders attacker instructions into system-level context before the model runs; controlled tests degraded model behavior and hijacked BrowserUse and OpenHands tool use. Defenders need to treat chat templates as executable release artifacts, verify their exact bytes and provenance, regression-test every conversion, and enforce tool and data-flow boundaries.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Embrace the Red (https://embracethered.com/blog/) demonstrated that ChatGPT's memory feature is vulnerable to manipulation via prompt injections. To execute the attack, the researcher hid a prompt injection in a shared Google Doc. When a user references the document, its contents is placed into ChatGPT's context via the Connected App feature, and the prompt is executed, poisoning the memory with false facts. The researcher demonstrated that these injected memories persist across chat sessions. Additionally, since the prompt injection payload is introduced through shared resources, this leaves others vulnerable to the same attack and maintains persistence on the system.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Adversaries create phishing websites that appear visually similar to legitimate sites. These sites are designed to trick users into entering their credentials, which are then sent to the bad actor. To combat this behavior, security companies utilize AI/ML-based approaches to detect phishing sites and block them in their endpoint security products. In this incident, adversarial examples were identified in the logs of a commercial machine learning phishing website detection system. The detection system makes an automated block/allow determination from the "phishing score" of an ensemble of image classifiers each responsible for different phishing indicators (visual similarity, input form detection, etc.). The adversarial examples appeared to employ several simple yet effective strategies for manually modifying brand logos in an attempt to evade image classification models. The phishing websites which employed logo modification methods successfully evaded the model responsible detecting brand impersonation via visual similarity. However, the other components of the system successfully flagged the phishing websites.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Embrace the Red (https://embracethered.com/blog/) demonstrated that Bard users' conversations could be exfiltrated via an indirect prompt injection. To execute the attack, a threat actor shares a Google Doc containing the prompt with the target user who then interacts with the document via Bard to inadvertently execute the prompt. The prompt causes Bard to respond with the markdown for an image, whose URL has the user's conversation secretly embedded. Bard renders the image for the user, creating an automatic request to an adversary-controlled script and exfiltrating the user's conversation. The request is not blocked by Google's Content Security Policy (CSP), because the script is hosted as a Google Apps Script with a Google-owned domain. Note: Google has fixed this vulnerability. The CSP remains the same, and Bard can still render images for the user, so there may be some filtering of data embedded in URLs.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Researchers identified that large language models such as ChatGPT can hallucinate fake software package names that are not published to a package repository. An attacker could publish a malicious package under the hallucinated name to a package repository. Then users of the same or similar large language models may encounter the same hallucination and ultimately download and execute the malicious package leading to a variety of potential harms.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Embrace the Red (https://embracethered.com/blog/) demonstrated that ChatGPT users' conversations can be exfiltrated via an indirect prompt injection. To execute the attack, a threat actor uploads a malicious prompt to a public website, where a ChatGPT user may interact with it. The prompt causes ChatGPT to respond with the markdown for an image, whose URL has the user's conversation secretly embedded. ChatGPT renders the image for the user, creating an automatic request to an adversary-controlled script and exfiltrating the user's conversation. Additionally, the researcher demonstrated how the prompt can execute other plugins, opening them up to additional harms.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Whenever interacting with Microsoft's new Bing Chat LLM Chatbot, a user can allow Bing Chat permission to view and access currently open websites throughout the chat session. Researchers demonstrated the ability for an attacker to plant an injection in a website the user is visiting, which silently turns Bing Chat into a Social Engineer who seeks out and exfiltrates personal information. The user doesn't have to ask about the website or do anything except interact with Bing Chat while the website is opened in the browser in order for this attack to be executed. In the provided demonstration, a user opened a prepared malicious website containing an indirect prompt injection attack (could also be on a social media site) in Edge. The website includes a prompt which is read by Bing and changes its behavior to access user information, which in turn can sent to an attacker.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.