AML.T0048.004 · AI Intellectual Property Theft

Explore 8 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0048.004 · AI Intellectual Property Theft in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may exfiltrate AI artifacts to steal intellectual property and cause economic harm to the victim organization. Proprietary training data is costly to collect and annotate and may be a target for [Exfiltration](/tactics/AML.TA0010) and theft. AIaaS providers charge for use of their API. An adversary who has stolen a model via [Exfiltration](/tactics/AML.TA0010) or via [Extract AI Model](/techniques/AML.T0024.002) now has unlimited use of that service without paying the owner of the intellectual property.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Incident ·

Industrial-Scale Distillation Across U.S. Frontier AI Services

NSA, CISA and FBI attributed coordinated distillation campaigns to six China-based AI companies. Their September 2026 advisory describes fraudulent accounts, bulk subscriptions, gray-market proxies, cross-provider routing, request-metadata removal and hidden-reasoning prompts, followed by response collection and quality checks. Distillation trains a model from another model’s outputs; the advisory’s attribution and capability-assessment claims are attributed to the agencies, not presented as independently reproduced measurements or model-weight theft.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Model Distillation Campaigns Target Google AI Services

Google reported campaigns that used compromised credentials, fraudulent accounts and proxies to collect model outputs for distillation: training another model from a provider’s responses. A February 2026 reasoning-focused campaign exceeded 100,000 prompts; later campaigns included some above 100 million. Those are campaign query volumes, not model weights stolen or a measured replication success rate. Google says it disrupted accounts and reduced the usefulness of collected outputs.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Model Distillation Campaigns Targeting Anthropic Claude

Anthropic attributed more than 16 million exchanges through roughly 24,000 fraudulent accounts to DeepSeek, Moonshot AI and MiniMax. The flow distinguishes proxy access, authenticated accounts, distributed routing, inference-response collection and downstream model training. Provider-side hunting and verified limits act before outputs leave; potential harms from models lacking safeguards remain Anthropic’s risk assessment, not observed downstream victim counts.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

AI Model Tampering via Supply Chain Attack

Researchers at Trend Micro, Inc. used service indexing portals and web searching tools to identify over 8,000 misconfigured private container registries exposed on the internet. Approximately 70% of the registries also had overly permissive access controls that allowed write access. In their analysis, the researchers found over 1,000 unique AI models embedded in private container images within these open registries that could be pulled without authentication. This exposure could allow adversaries to download, inspect, and modify container contents, including sensitive AI model files. This is an exposure of valuable intellectual property which could be stolen by an adversary. Compromised images could also be pushed to the registry, leading to a supply chain attack, allowing malicious actors to compromise the integrity of AI models used in production systems.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Organization Confusion on Hugging Face

threlfall_hax (https://5stars217.github.io/), a security researcher, created organization accounts on Hugging Face, a public model repository, that impersonated real organizations. These false Hugging Face organization accounts looked legitimate so individuals from the impersonated organizations requested to join, believing the accounts to be an official site for employees to share models. This gave the researcher full access to any AI models uploaded by the employees, including the ability to replace models with malicious versions. The researcher demonstrated that they could embed malware into an AI model that provided them access to the victim organization's environment. From there, threat actors could execute a range of damaging attacks such as intellectual property theft or poisoning other AI models within the victim's environment.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Arbitrary Code Execution with Google Colab

Google Colab is a Jupyter Notebook service that executes on virtual machines. Jupyter Notebooks are often used for ML and data science research and experimentation, containing executable snippets of Python code and common Unix command-line functionality. In addition to data manipulation and visualization, this code execution functionality can allow users to download arbitrary files from the internet, manipulate files on the virtual machine, and so on. Users can also share Jupyter Notebooks with other users via links. In the case of notebooks with malicious code, users may unknowingly execute the offending code, which may be obfuscated or hidden in a downloaded script, for example. When a user opens a shared Jupyter Notebook in Colab, they are asked whether they'd like to allow the notebook to access their Google Drive. While there can be legitimate reasons for allowing Google Drive access, such as to allow a user to substitute their own files, there can also be malicious effects such as data exfiltration or opening a server to the victim's Google Drive. This exercise raises awareness of the effects of arbitrary code execution and Colab's Google Drive integration. Practice secure evaluations of shared Colab notebook links and examine code prior to execution.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Attack on Machine Translation Services

Machine translation services (such as Google Translate, Bing Translator, and Systran Translate) provide public-facing UIs and APIs. A research group at UC Berkeley utilized these public endpoints to create a replicated model with near-production state-of-the-art translation quality. Beyond demonstrating that IP can be functionally stolen from a black-box system, they used the replicated model to successfully transfer adversarial examples to the real production services. These adversarial inputs successfully cause targeted word flips, vulgar outputs, and dropped sentences on Google Translate and Systran Translate websites.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Google Photos AI Model Extraction

Skyld researchers analyzed the Google Photos Android application and recovered TensorFlow Lite models used by AI-powered photo editing and image analysis features. The researchers found models stored unencrypted in the application's assets, embedded in the native library, and encrypted on disk. They used static reverse engineering to locate TFLite artifacts and dynamic instrumentation with Frida to capture encrypted models after runtime decryption. The recovered models provided white-box access to proprietary Google Photos model artifacts.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗