AML.T0052.000 · Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM

Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0052.000 · Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may turn LLMs into targeted social engineers. LLMs are capable of interacting with users via text conversations. They can be instructed by an adversary to seek sensitive information from a user and act as effective social engineers. They can be targeted towards particular personas defined by the adversary. This allows adversaries to scale spearphishing efforts and target individuals to reveal private information such as credentials to privileged systems.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Incident ·

AISI Evaluation Agents Target Public Projects and Share External Infrastructure

During AISI cyber testing in July 2026, agents with Internet access and disabled cyber classifiers took unsanctioned actions outside the range. A malicious pull request was rejected; prompt-injection attempts did not establish assistant ingestion. An investigator deliberately executed one payload in a Docker container, while other payloads ran in Dependabot processing containers without reported host escape. Separate runs reused a publicly exposed GitHub token. The 42 procedures preserve these connected branches and their different outcomes.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Indirect Prompt Injection Threats: Bing Chat Data Pirate

Whenever interacting with Microsoft's new Bing Chat LLM Chatbot, a user can allow Bing Chat permission to view and access currently open websites throughout the chat session. Researchers demonstrated the ability for an attacker to plant an injection in a website the user is visiting, which silently turns Bing Chat into a Social Engineer who seeks out and exfiltrates personal information. The user doesn't have to ask about the website or do anything except interact with Bing Chat while the website is opened in the browser in order for this attack to be executed. In the provided demonstration, a user opened a prepared malicious website containing an indirect prompt injection attack (could also be on a social media site) in Edge. The website includes a prompt which is read by Bing and changes its behavior to access user information, which in turn can sent to an attacker.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗