AML.T0052 · Phishing

Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0052 · Phishing in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Generative AI, including LLMs that generate synthetic text, visual deepfakes of faces, and audio deepfakes of speech (See [Generate Deepfakes](/techniques/AML.T0088)), is enabling adversaries to scale targeted phishing campaigns (See [Spearphishing via Social Engineering LLM](/techniques/AML.T0052.000)). LLMs can interact with users via text conversations and can be programmed with a system prompt to phish for sensitive information. Deepfakes can also be used in [Impersonation](/techniques/AML.T0073) as an aid to phishing.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

GitHub Copilot CLI: Phished Device Code Authorization Enables Session Steering and Memory Poisoning

GitHub Copilot CLI is a coding assistant that runs in a terminal. Microsoft showed in a lab that a developer could be tricked into approving an attacker's device sign-in on the real GitHub site. GitHub then issues an OAuth access token to the initiating client. Depending on the permissions and enabled features, the token could steer an active local session, plant misleading Copilot Memory, read cloud-synced conversations, or access private repositories. Each outcome has its own prerequisites.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

LAMEHUG: Malware Leveraging Dynamic AI-Generated Commands

In July 2025, Ukrainian authorities reported the emergence of LAMEHUG, a new AI-powered malware attributed to the Russian state-backed threat actor APT28 (https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007/) (also tracked as Forest Blizzard or UAC-0001). LAMEHUG uses a large language model (LLM) to dynamically generate commands on the infected hosts. The campaign began with a phishing attack leveraging a compromised government email account to deliver a malicious ZIP archive disguised as Appendix.pdf.zip. The archive contained the LAMEHUG malware, a Python-based executable, packed with PyInstaller. When executed, the malware makes calls to an LLM endpoint to generate malicious commands from natural language prompts. Dynamically generated commands may make the malware harder to detect. LAMEHUG was configured to collect files from the local system and exfiltrate them.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Attempted Evasion of ML Phishing Webpage Detection System

Adversaries create phishing websites that appear visually similar to legitimate sites. These sites are designed to trick users into entering their credentials, which are then sent to the bad actor. To combat this behavior, security companies utilize AI/ML-based approaches to detect phishing sites and block them in their endpoint security products. In this incident, adversarial examples were identified in the logs of a commercial machine learning phishing website detection system. The detection system makes an automated block/allow determination from the "phishing score" of an ensemble of image classifiers each responsible for different phishing indicators (visual similarity, input form detection, etc.). The adversarial examples appeared to employ several simple yet effective strategies for manually modifying brand logos in an attempt to evade image classification models. The phishing websites which employed logo modification methods successfully evaded the model responsible detecting brand impersonation via visual similarity. However, the other components of the system successfully flagged the phishing websites.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗