Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0057 · LLM Data Leakage in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may craft prompts that induce the LLM to leak sensitive information. This can include private user data or proprietary information. The leaked information may come from proprietary training data, data sources the LLM is connected to, or information from other users of the LLM.
Xint tested OpenAI's conversation-compaction API, which compresses earlier work for later model calls. A client-steered compaction carried protected reasoning from gpt-5.6-sol into an encrypted item accepted by gpt-4.1 and gpt-4o, which echoed readable content. This was controlled API research using the researchers' own puzzles, not a demonstrated theft of another user's conversations. Xint reports an undisclosed fix on October 23, 2026.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Stolen Thoughts found that opaque reasoning blocks returned by Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google APIs could be accepted across sessions, users, or compatible models within a provider family. An attacker who first obtained another user's block could submit it to a weaker compatible model and jailbreak that model into transcribing hidden reasoning. In 6,708 public agent trajectories, the researchers reconstructed 315,320 blocks and found real sensitive artifacts in 328 sessions. They report that provider mitigations later made the demonstrated attacks non-reproducible.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.