AML.T0061 · LLM Prompt Self-Replication

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0061 · LLM Prompt Self-Replication in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

An adversary may use a carefully crafted [LLM Prompt Injection](/techniques/AML.T0051) designed to cause the LLM to replicate the prompt as part of its output. This allows the prompt to propagate to other LLMs and persist on the system. The self-replicating prompt is typically paired with other malicious instructions (ex: [LLM Jailbreak](/techniques/AML.T0054), [LLM Data Leakage](/techniques/AML.T0057)).

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Exercise ·

Morris II Worm: RAG-Based Attack

Morris II is a constructed research demonstration in which a RAG email assistant retrieves a malicious message, copies its instructions into a generated reply and includes sensitive correspondence data. The automatic email workflow then sends that response onward. The graph separates source delivery, corpus storage, retrieved instruction following, generated content and the two security effects of sending it; the branches do not imply two independently observed emails or a real-world victim campaign.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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