AML.T0063 · Discover AI Model Outputs

Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0063 · Discover AI Model Outputs in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may discover model outputs, such as class scores, whose presence is not required for the system to function and are not intended for use by the end user. Model outputs may be found in logs or may be included in API responses. Model outputs may enable the adversary to identify weaknesses in the model and develop attacks.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Incident ·

Industrial-Scale Distillation Across U.S. Frontier AI Services

NSA, CISA and FBI attributed coordinated distillation campaigns to six China-based AI companies. Their September 2026 advisory describes fraudulent accounts, bulk subscriptions, gray-market proxies, cross-provider routing, request-metadata removal and hidden-reasoning prompts, followed by response collection and quality checks. Distillation trains a model from another model’s outputs; the advisory’s attribution and capability-assessment claims are attributed to the agencies, not presented as independently reproduced measurements or model-weight theft.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

ProofPoint Evasion

Proof Pudding (CVE-2019-20634) is a code repository that describes how ML researchers evaded ProofPoint's email protection system by first building a copy-cat email protection ML model, and using the insights to bypass the live system. More specifically, the insights allowed researchers to craft malicious emails that received preferable scores, going undetected by the system. Each word in an email is scored numerically based on multiple variables and if the overall score of the email is too low, ProofPoint will output an error, labeling it as SPAM.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Bypassing Cylance's AI Malware Detection

Researchers at Skylight were able to create a universal bypass string that evades detection by Cylance's AI Malware detector when appended to a malicious file.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗