AML.T0067 · LLM Trusted Output Components Manipulation

Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0067 · LLM Trusted Output Components Manipulation in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may utilize prompts to a large language model (LLM) which manipulate various components of its response in order to make it appear trustworthy to the user. This helps the adversary continue to operate in the victim's environment and evade detection by the users it interacts with. The LLM may be instructed to tailor its language to appear more trustworthy to the user or attempt to manipulate the user to take certain actions. Other response components that could be manipulated include links, recommended follow-up actions, retrieved document metadata, and [Citations](/techniques/AML.T0067.000).

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

Rules File Backdoor: Supply Chain Attack on AI Coding Assistants

Researchers showed that poisoned AI coding-assistant rules can hide Unicode instructions, pose as company policy and cause malicious script references to appear in generated HTML without disclosure. The graph also distinguishes inheritance through project forks or templates from execution in the original project. That propagation branch copies an existing rules file; it is not evidence of an agent generating and sending a self-replicating prompt.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Poisoned GGUF Chat Templates Backdoor Inference Without Changing Model Weights

Researchers from Pillar Security and Fujitsu showed that a GGUF artifact can carry a modified Jinja chat template while its model weights remain unchanged. When a trigger appears, the inference engine renders attacker instructions into system-level context before the model runs; controlled tests degraded model behavior and hijacked BrowserUse and OpenHands tool use. Defenders need to treat chat templates as executable release artifacts, verify their exact bytes and provenance, regression-test every conversion, and enforce tool and data-flow boundaries.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Microsoft "EchoLeak": How One Email Turned Microsoft 365 Copilot into a Zero-Click Data Exfiltration Path

EchoLeak shows how one external email can move from "reference material" to "instructions the model obeys" once Microsoft 365 Copilot (Microsoft's enterprise AI assistant for Microsoft 365 data) retrieves it into the same answer context as internal data. The exploit then hides sensitive data inside a Markdown link or image URL and relies on automatic fetching plus a CSP-allowed Microsoft Teams proxy to send that data out with zero clicks. The defensive lesson is broader than a better classifier: teams need retrieval-time scanning, trust-boundary separation, sink enforcement, and output-layer leak blocking.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗