AML.T0080 · AI Agent Context Poisoning

Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0080 · AI Agent Context Poisoning in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may attempt to manipulate the context used by an AI agent's large language model (LLM) to influence the responses it generates or actions it takes. This allows an adversary to persistently change the behavior of the target agent and further their goals. Context poisoning can be accomplished by prompting the LLM to add instructions or preferences to memory (See [Memory](/techniques/AML.T0080.000)) or by simply prompting an LLM that uses prior messages in a thread as part of its context (See [Thread](/techniques/AML.T0080.001)).

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

Notion AI Agent Lethal Trifecta Leads to Silent Data Exfiltration

Two disclosures demonstrated distinct Notion AI exfiltration paths. CodeIntegrity used a customer-feedback PDF and functions.search to send client data in a URL. PromptArmor used a poisoned resume during a hiring-tracker update; an image request leaked data before approval. In its January 8, 2026 update, PromptArmor confirmed that remediation of the document-update flaw was in production. The update does not establish an exact deployment time.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Moltbook Shows How Agent Social Feeds Can Become a Global Callback Surface

Zenity used coordinated Moltbook posts (agent-facing social-feed content) to make more than 1,000 agent endpoints connected to OpenClaw (an agent platform) fetch a benign controlled link in under a week. This is not a destructive exploit, but it is a strong warning: agent social content is not just content. If agents can ingest it and act on it, it becomes an execution and egress surface.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Prompt Mines Show Why CRM Agents Need Write-Action Gates

Zenity's Prompt Mines research shows how attacker-created Salesforce (a CRM platform) cases can sit quietly in Einstein (Salesforce's AI assistant layer for CRM workflows) context until a normal follow-up question activates them. The key control is not only prompt filtering; CRM write actions such as UpdateCustomerContact need request-scoped authority, independent validation, and recovery-ready data integrity controls.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗