AML.T0083 · Credentials from AI Agent Configuration
Explore 5 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0083 · Credentials from AI Agent Configuration in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may access the credentials of other tools or services on a system from the configuration of an AI agent. AI Agents often utilize external tools or services to take actions, such as querying databases, invoking APIs, or interacting with cloud resources. To enable these functions, credentials like API keys, tokens, and connection strings are frequently stored in configuration files. While there are secure methods such as dedicated secret managers or encrypted vaults that can be deployed to store and manage these credentials, in practice they are often placed in less protected locations for convenience or ease of deployment. If an attacker can read or extract these configurations, they may obtain valid credentials that allow direct access to sensitive systems outside the agent itself.
Sekoia recorded six phases of real attacker traffic against an internet-facing decoy that emulated Flowise 2.2.8, a platform for building AI workflows. The exposed management API let the attacker retrieve planted credentials and add a workflow configured to call back. The attacker then tried to override prompts, probe session memory and ask the simulated agent about real third-party infrastructure. The decoy returned simulated responses, so the requests do not establish real command execution, database access or a Nightingale compromise.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Remus is Windows malware that steals application data after gaining execution on a device. SpyCloud identified AI-client directories among its configurable collection targets, including Codex, Cursor and OpenCode. The AI-security exposure is reusable credentials and locally retained activity data; protecting an agent tool alone does not contain malware already running elsewhere on the host.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
On October 21, LiteLLM, a Python library and gateway for accessing model providers, published a credential-stealing 1.107.0 release through its legitimate build and signing pipeline. The vendor's October 23 investigation traces entry to an unrevoked master key leaked from its experimental Agent Platform, followed by theft of an organization-owner GitHub token. Separate CI runs stole two maintainer tokens. Consumer-side admission of previously approved exact bytes, and revocation at each credential issuer, address boundaries that a valid release signature did not protect.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
A security researcher identified hundreds of exposed ClawdBot control interfaces on the public internet. ClawdBot (now OpenClaw) "is a personal AI assistant you run on your own devices. It answers you on the channels you already use ... , plus extension channels. ... It can speak and listen on macOS/iOS/Android, and can render a live Canvas you control." The researcher was able to access credentials to a variety of connected applications via ClawdBot's configuration file. They were also able to invoke ClawdBot's skills by prompting it via the chat interface, leading to root access in the container. The researcher searched Shodan to identify Clawdbot instances exposed on the public internet, some without authentication enabled. The researcher demonstrated that the ClawdBot's authentication mechanism could be bypassed due to a proxy misconfiguration. With access to ClawdBot's control interface, they were then able to access ClawdBot's configuration, which contained credentials to a variety of other services. Across various exposed instances of ClawdBot, they identified Anthropic API Keys, Telegram Bot Tokens, Slack Oauth Credentials, and Signal Device Linking URIs. The researcher prompted ClawdBot directly via the chat interface, which led to exposure of its system prompt. They were also able to get ClawdBot to execute commands via its bash skill, which at least in at least one instance led to root access in the ClawdBot container. The researcher noted a broad range of other impacts they could have had with this level of access, including: - Manipulation of user chat history with the ClawdBot AI agent - Exfiltration of conversation histories of any connected messaging services - Impersonation of users by sending messages on their behalf via connected messaging services
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
The Backslash Security Research Team demonstrated that a Model Context Protocol (MCP) tool can be used as a vector for an indirect prompt injection attack on Cursor, potentially leading to the execution of malicious shell commands. The Backslash Security Research Team created a proof-of-concept MCP server capable of scraping webpages. When a user asks Cursor to use the tool to scrape a site containing a malicious prompt, the prompt is injected into Cursor's context. The prompt instructs Cursor to execute a shell command to exfiltrate the victim's AI agent configuration files containing credentials. Cursor does prompt the user before executing the malicious command, potentially mitigating the attack.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.