AML.T0084.002 · Activation Triggers

Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0084.002 · Activation Triggers in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may discover keywords or other triggers (such as incoming emails, documents being added, incoming message, or other workflows) that activate an agent and may cause it to run additional actions. Understanding these triggers can reveal how the AI agent is activated and controlled. This may also expose additional paths for compromise, as an adversary could attempt to trigger the agent from outside its environment and drive it to perform unintended or malicious actions.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Exercise ·

Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio

Researchers from Zenity demonstrated how an organization's data can be exfiltrated via prompt injections that target an AI-powered customer service agent. The target system is a customer service agent built by Zenity in Copilot Studio. It is modeled after an agent built by McKinsey to streamline its customer service needs. The AI agent listens to a customer service email inbox where customers send their engagement requests. Upon receiving a request, the agent looks at the customer's previous engagements, understands who the best consultant for the case is, and proceeds to send an email to the respective consultant regarding the request, including all of the relevant context the consultant will need to properly engage with the customer. The Zenity researchers begin by performing targeting to identify an email inbox that is managed by an AI agent. Then they use prompt injections to discover details about the AI agent, such as its knowledge sources and tools. Once they understand the AI agent's capabilities, the researchers are able to craft a prompt that retrieves private customer data from the organization's RAG database and CRM, and exfiltrate it via the AI agent's email tool. Vendor Response: Microsoft quickly acknowledged and fixed the issue. The prompts used by the Zenity researchers in this exercise no longer work, however other prompts may still be effective.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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Validated Research ·

Claude Code GitHub Action: When a File-Read Tool Crosses the CI Secret Boundary

Microsoft found that untrusted GitHub issue, pull request, or comment text could direct Claude Code GitHub Action to read /proc/self/environ . Bash commands were inside bubblewrap and received a scrubbed environment, but the in-process Read tool used a different path and returned ANTHROPIC_API_KEY ; removing its prefix helped evade refusal and GitHub redaction. Anthropic patched the reported sensitive /proc read, but every tool path still needs the same secret boundary and deterministic authorization.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗