AML.T0084 · Discover AI Agent Configuration

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0084 · Discover AI Agent Configuration in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may attempt to discover configuration information for AI agents present on the victim's system. Agent configurations can include tools or services they have access to. Adversaries may directly access agent configuring dashboards or configuration files. They may also obtain configuration details by prompting the agent with questions such as "What tools do you have access to?" Adversaries can use the information they discover about AI agents to help with targeting.

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Validated Research ·

Prompt-Based Attacks Against Gemini via Calendar Invitations

SafeBreach demonstrated indirect prompt injection through Calendar invitations and email in Gemini web and Android applications. Retrieved instructions could immediately alter replies or invoke Calendar actions. Other routes retained instructions in conversation history and used a later victim interaction to invoke Google Home, open a website, or launch Zoom. In the Gmail exfiltration route, the initial reply first assembled a source URL containing another email subject; a later interaction opened that existing URL. These are distinct controlled demonstrations, not a single path requiring every impact or a confirmed malicious campaign.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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