AML.T0085.000 · RAG Databases

Explore 4 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0085.000 · RAG Databases in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may prompt the AI service to retrieve data from a RAG database. This can include the majority of an organization's internal documents.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Incident ·

Flowise Honeypot: Unauthenticated API Abuse, Beacon Setup, and Agent Probing

Sekoia recorded six phases of real attacker traffic against an internet-facing decoy that emulated Flowise 2.2.8, a platform for building AI workflows. The exposed management API let the attacker retrieve planted credentials and add a workflow configured to call back. The attacker then tried to override prompts, probe session memory and ask the simulated agent about real third-party infrastructure. The decoy returned simulated responses, so the requests do not establish real command execution, database access or a Nightingale compromise.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Data Exfiltration via Agent Tools in Copilot Studio

Researchers from Zenity demonstrated how an organization's data can be exfiltrated via prompt injections that target an AI-powered customer service agent. The target system is a customer service agent built by Zenity in Copilot Studio. It is modeled after an agent built by McKinsey to streamline its customer service needs. The AI agent listens to a customer service email inbox where customers send their engagement requests. Upon receiving a request, the agent looks at the customer's previous engagements, understands who the best consultant for the case is, and proceeds to send an email to the respective consultant regarding the request, including all of the relevant context the consultant will need to properly engage with the customer. The Zenity researchers begin by performing targeting to identify an email inbox that is managed by an AI agent. Then they use prompt injections to discover details about the AI agent, such as its knowledge sources and tools. Once they understand the AI agent's capabilities, the researchers are able to craft a prompt that retrieves private customer data from the organization's RAG database and CRM, and exfiltrate it via the AI agent's email tool. Vendor Response: Microsoft quickly acknowledged and fixed the issue. The prompts used by the Zenity researchers in this exercise no longer work, however other prompts may still be effective.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Exercise ·

Morris II Worm: RAG-Based Attack

Morris II is a constructed research demonstration in which a RAG email assistant retrieves a malicious message, copies its instructions into a generated reply and includes sensitive correspondence data. The automatic email workflow then sends that response onward. The graph separates source delivery, corpus storage, retrieved instruction following, generated content and the two security effects of sending it; the branches do not imply two independently observed emails or a real-world victim campaign.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Microsoft "EchoLeak": How One Email Turned Microsoft 365 Copilot into a Zero-Click Data Exfiltration Path

EchoLeak shows how one external email can move from "reference material" to "instructions the model obeys" once Microsoft 365 Copilot (Microsoft's enterprise AI assistant for Microsoft 365 data) retrieves it into the same answer context as internal data. The exploit then hides sensitive data inside a Markdown link or image URL and relies on automatic fetching plus a CSP-allowed Microsoft Teams proxy to send that data out with zero clicks. The defensive lesson is broader than a better classifier: teams need retrieval-time scanning, trust-boundary separation, sink enforcement, and output-layer leak blocking.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗