Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0091.001 · Web Session Cookie in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may use stolen web session cookies to authenticate to AI-enabled applications and supporting services as another user. This technique may bypass some multi-factor authentication controls because the session represented by the cookie has already been authenticated. Authentication cookies are commonly used by web applications and cloud-based services after a user has authenticated, allowing the user to continue using the service without repeatedly passing credentials. These cookies may remain valid for extended periods of time. After obtaining a cookie through [Steal Web Session Cookie](/techniques/AML.T0103), an adversary may import the cookie into a browser or automated client they control and access the corresponding application as the victim while the session remains active. In attacks on AI systems, web session cookies may grant access to AI chat histories, AI agent control panels, model provider dashboards, customer support systems, retrieval or knowledge management interfaces, or AI DevOps resources. If the stolen cookie belongs to an operator, support agent, developer, or administrator, the adversary may be able to view sensitive conversations, manipulate agent configuration, access private data available through AI tools, or perform actions with the victim account's permissions.
Cybernews researchers demonstrated that Lenovo's AI chatbot "Lena" was vulnerable to a prompt injection that produced malicious HTML which was saved in the chat history and could exfiltrate a human support agent's session cookie when rendered in their browser. The researchers prompted Lena with a benign-looking product information request that included instructions to respond with a dangerous HTML payload. The response was saved in the user's chat history, creating a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) payload. When the researchers requested transfer to a human support agent, the agent's normal workflow of opening the chat transcript caused the poisoned content to render, exfiltrating session cookie data to an attacker-controlled server. If a valid support agent cookie were reused, an adversary could potentially access Lenovo's customer support platform as that agent and view customer conversations or perform other actions available to the account. Lenovo acknowledged the issue and reported implementing corrective actions to mitigate the potential impact and address the issue.
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