AML.T0095 · Search Open Websites/Domains

Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0095 · Search Open Websites/Domains in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may search public websites and/or domains for information about victims and AI targets that can be used during targeting and to discover opportunities for successful attacks. Information about a victim's attack surface may be available in various online sites, such as social media, news sites, or domains owned by the victim. Adversaries may find the information they seek to gather via search engines. They can use precise search queries to identify software platforms or services used by the victim to use in targeting. This may be followed by [Exploit Public-Facing Application](/techniques/AML.T0049) or [Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application](/techniques/AML.T0093). Adversaries may utilize OSINT-based discovery to map different AI assets by using search engine result pages, as well as backlink analysis, to locate agentic interfaces (which are frequently embedded via iFrames and follow predictable naming conventions). By analyzing the indexed URL structures of these sources from different search engines, attackers can often reverse-engineer internal environment IDs and organization-specific naming conventions. This intelligence gathering significantly narrows the search space for any later targeted fuzzing or enumeration performed by [Active Scanning: Enumerate Hosted AI Resources](/techniques/AML.T0006.000).

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

AI in the Middle: Web-Based AI Services as C2 Relays

Check Point Research demonstrated an "AI in the Middle" attack in which malware can abuse web-based AI assistants with anonymous or unauthenticated browsing and URL-fetch capabilities as a covert command-and-control channel. The proof of concept used public AI web interfaces, including Grok and Microsoft Copilot, to cause the AI service to fetch attacker-controlled URLs, relay victim data in outbound requests, and return attacker-supplied commands through normal AI assistant responses. Because the implant communicated with trusted AI service domains over ordinary HTTPS web traffic, the activity could blend into expected enterprise AI usage and evade controls focused on suspicious infrastructure, unusual protocols, API keys, service accounts, or revocable credentials. The lack of required authentication for some web-fetch workflows also made it harder for defenders to disable the channel by rotating API keys, suspending accounts, or revoking tokens. The researchers recommended stronger authentication and access controls for AI web-fetch features, along with improved visibility into AI-initiated network requests and AI assistant interactions.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Model Namespace Reuse Turns a Trusted Name Into a Supply-Chain Redirect

Unit 42 showed that a deleted Hugging Face author namespace, or a transferred model whose former author namespace later becomes reclaimable, can leave stale references pointing to a name another party can register. In controlled tests, researchers reclaimed abandoned namespaces, recreated expected model paths, and made Vertex AI and Azure AI Foundry deployments load reverse-shell models. The original publisher account was not compromised. Defenders should bind deployments to immutable digests and signers, monitor namespace lifecycles, mirror approved artifacts internally, and isolate model loading.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Living Off AI: Prompt Injection via Jira Service Management

Researchers from Cato Networks demonstrated how adversaries can exploit AI-powered systems embedded in enterprise workflows to execute malicious actions with elevated privileges. This is achieved by crafting malicious inputs from external users such as support tickets that are later processed by internal users or automated systems using AI agents. These AI agents, operating with internal context and trust, may interpret and execute the malicious instructions, leading to unauthorized actions such as data exfiltration, privilege escalation, or system manipulation.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗