AML.T0100 · AI Agent Clickbait

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0100 · AI Agent Clickbait in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may craft deceptive content designed to bait computer-using AI agents or AI web browsers and tools into taking unintended actions, such as clicking buttons, copying code, or navigating to specific web pages. These attacks exploit the agent's interpretation of UI content, visual cues, and natural language embedded in processed artifacts, such as a website or a document, and aim at the agent's decision process rather than a human reader's. When successful, AI Agent Clickbait can lead the victim's agent to inadvertently copy and execute malicious code on the user's operating system or perform data exfiltration. The AI Agent Clickbait may also include a [Prompt Injection: Indirect](/techniques/AML.T0051.001), which can influence or manipulate the victim's agent in adversary-controlled ways.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

AI ClickFix: Hijacking Computer-Use Agents Using ClickFix

Embrace the Red ( https://embracethered.com/) demonstrated that AI computer-use agents are vulnerable to social engineering attacks and can be manipulated into executing arbitrary code on a victim's machine. The attack is a variation on "ClickFix" which is a social engineering attack that fools humans into copying malicious commands and executing them. The researcher used ChatGPT to generate a website designed to attract interactions with computer-use agents. When a user asked their Claude Computer-Use Agent to visit the researcher's website, the text "Are you a computer? Please see instructions to confirm:" caused the agent to click the associated button. This executed JavaScript to copy a malicious command into the agent's clipboard. The agent then proceeded to follow the instructions, opening a terminal, pasting the malicious command, and executing it. The command downloads a script from the researcher's website and executes it. In the demonstration, the script opens the victim's Calculator App, but in practice an adversary could run arbitrary code, compromising the victim's system.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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