Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0110.000 · Definition and Instructions in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may poison the model-visible definition or operational instructions of an AI agent tool to manipulate how an agent interprets, selects, or invokes the tool. The poisoned content may be contained in tool descriptions, docstrings, parameter names, help text, input or output schemas, annotations, examples, manifests, skill instruction files, or other static content used to explain a tool's capabilities to the model. Malicious instructions in this layer may direct the agent to collect additional data, populate hidden or unnecessary parameters, conceal actions from the user, or invoke other tools. Because an agent may receive a more complete representation of a tool than is shown in the user interface, the model may process malicious instructions that are invisible or only partially visible to a human reviewer[[invariant-tool-poisoning]]. Definition poisoning may also be used for tool shadowing, in which the definition of one malicious tool contains instructions that alter how the agent selects or invokes another trusted tool. The poisoned tool may not need to be invoked for its definition to influence the agent if definitions from multiple connected tools are included in the same model context[[invariant-tool-poisoning]].
Researchers at Invariant Labs demonstrated that AI agents configured with remote Model Context Protocol (MCP) Tools can be vulnerable to model poisoning attacks. They show that an MCP Tool can contain malicious prompts in its docstring description, which is ingested into the AI agent's context, modifying its behavior. They demonstrate this attack with a proof-of-concept MCP Tool that instructs the agent to perform additional actions before using the tool. The agent is instructed to read files containing credentials from the victim's machine and store their contents in one of the input variables to the tool. When the tool runs, the victim's credentials are exfiltrated to the poisoned MCP server.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Zenity disrupted an active campaign that impersonated Paperclip and Browser Use through look-alike organizations, skills, repositories, and packages. The Paperclip skill family appeared on skills.sh while its skill documents were still benign, accumulated displayed installs, and was weaponized on July 11 with instructions that steered agents to attacker-controlled code and a remote loader. A Browser Use lure instead instructed agents to install a trojanized PyPI package. Recovered payloads searched more than 100 configured paths and posted a base64-encoded plaintext bundle to api[.]getpaperclipp[.]com/feedback . The reported 1.7 million figure is an aggregate displayed-install counter, not unique users or confirmed infections.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
A security researcher demonstrated a proof-of-concept supply chain attack using a poisoned ClawdBot Skill shared on ClawdHub, a Skill registry for agents. The poisoned Skill contained a prompt injection that caused ClawdBot to execute a shell command that reached the researcher's server. Although the researcher here used this access simply to warn users about the danger, they could have instead delivered a malicious payload and compromised the user's system. The security researcher recorded 16 different users who downloaded and executed the poisoned Skill in the first 8 hours of it being published on ClawdHub.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.