Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0110.001 · Implementation in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may poison the executable implementation of an AI agent tool so that normal tool invocation produces unauthorized behavior or hidden side effects. The tool may continue to provide its represented functionality while also accessing additional data, modifying requests, changing recipients or destinations, executing unauthorized commands, weakening security controls, or performing covert data exfiltration. Implementation poisoning does not require the model to interpret or follow malicious instructions. The adversarial effect is produced by executable logic when the agent or user invokes the tool. For example, a poisoned email tool may send the requested message while silently adding an adversary-controlled blind-copy recipient. A file-processing tool may return the requested result while also transmitting the source file to an external service. Implementation poisoning may be introduced before publication, through compromise of a tool's source repository or build process, or through a malicious update after users have adopted a benign version. Installed copies may continue to exhibit the poisoned behavior even after the malicious package or remote listing is removed[[koi-postmark]].
A bad actor successfully exfiltrated emails from users of the Postmark's MCP server via a supply chain attack. Postmark is an email delivery service that allows organizations to send marketing and transactional emails via API. The Postmark MCP server allows users to interact with Postmark via AI agents. The bad actor impersonated Postmark, by registering the postmark-mcp package name on npm. They initially published the legitimate versions of the MCP server. After the package became popular and reached over 1,000 downloads per week, the bad actor performed a rugpull and uploaded a malicious version of the package. The malicious version added the bad actor's email address in the BCC line of all emails sent by the MCP tool. Users who upgraded to this version and continued to use the tool would have all emails exfiltrated to the bad actor.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.