Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0111 · AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation is the process of building or leveraging genuinely credible-looking trust signals to increase the perceived legitimacy of AI supply chain components, with the goal of driving adoption of malicious or compromised assets. Adversaries use established developer accounts with a history of legitimate projects and contributions to publish AI models, datasets, packages, and MCP servers that appear trustworthy. They build reputation through real adoption signals such as downloads, GitHub stars, forks, and inclusion in dependency chains, often releasing benign versions before introducing malicious updates via [AI Supply Chain Rug Pull](/techniques/AML.T0109). By relying on authentic history and usage patterns, these components pass both human and automated trust checks, increasing the likelihood they are adopted without scrutiny.
Zenity disrupted an active campaign that impersonated Paperclip and Browser Use through look-alike organizations, skills, repositories, and packages. The Paperclip skill family appeared on skills.sh while its skill documents were still benign, accumulated displayed installs, and was weaponized on July 11 with instructions that steered agents to attacker-controlled code and a remote loader. A Browser Use lure instead instructed agents to install a trojanized PyPI package. Recovered payloads searched more than 100 configured paths and posted a base64-encoded plaintext bundle to api[.]getpaperclipp[.]com/feedback . The reported 1.7 million figure is an aggregate displayed-install counter, not unique users or confirmed infections.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
A security researcher demonstrated a proof-of-concept supply chain attack using a poisoned ClawdBot Skill shared on ClawdHub, a Skill registry for agents. The poisoned Skill contained a prompt injection that caused ClawdBot to execute a shell command that reached the researcher's server. Although the researcher here used this access simply to warn users about the danger, they could have instead delivered a malicious payload and compromised the user's system. The security researcher recorded 16 different users who downloaded and executed the poisoned Skill in the first 8 hours of it being published on ClawdHub.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.