AML.T0112.000 · Local AI Agent

Explore 6 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0112.000 · Local AI Agent in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may achieve full system compromise by abusing AI agents running locally on a host, such as computer-use agents or AI-driven browsers. These agents are designed to autonomously interact with the operating system, applications, and external services, often with broad permissions to execute commands, access files, manage credentials, and control user workflows. If an adversary is able to take control of an AI agent's behavior, they effectively gain the same level of access as the agent. This can result in complete control over the machine, including executing arbitrary code, accessing or exfiltrating sensitive data, modifying system configurations, and establishing persistence.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

LLMSmith: RCE Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Applications

The LLMSmith paper reports 20 vulnerabilities across 11 LLM frameworks: 19 remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities and one arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of 51 assessed applications, 17 were exploitable: 16 through RCE and one through SQL injection. The evaluated frameworks were LangChain, LlamaIndex, Pandas-ai, Langflow, Pandas-llm, Auto-GPT, Griptape, Lagent, MetaGPT, vanna, and langroid. The public-application study reports reverse shells on 14 applications. Additional hazard demonstrations, including backdoors and attacks on other users, used local white-box replicas to avoid harming real services; they are not all observations from production exploitation.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

AI ClickFix: Hijacking Computer-Use Agents Using ClickFix

Embrace the Red ( https://embracethered.com/) demonstrated that AI computer-use agents are vulnerable to social engineering attacks and can be manipulated into executing arbitrary code on a victim's machine. The attack is a variation on "ClickFix" which is a social engineering attack that fools humans into copying malicious commands and executing them. The researcher used ChatGPT to generate a website designed to attract interactions with computer-use agents. When a user asked their Claude Computer-Use Agent to visit the researcher's website, the text "Are you a computer? Please see instructions to confirm:" caused the agent to click the associated button. This executed JavaScript to copy a malicious command into the agent's clipboard. The agent then proceeded to follow the instructions, opening a terminal, pasting the malicious command, and executing it. The command downloads a script from the researcher's website and executes it. In the demonstration, the script opens the victim's Calculator App, but in practice an adversary could run arbitrary code, compromising the victim's system.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Ollama Windows Auto-Update Persistent RCE

Striga and CERT Polska documented a chained flaw in Ollama for Windows 0.12.10 through 0.22.0: attacker-influenced update responses could provide malicious ETag or Content-Disposition path values, the updater could write a payload outside its staging directory such as the Windows Startup folder, Windows signature verification was a no-op, and the payload could run persistently on later logins. Ollama first shipped the hardened update flow in v0.23.3.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

JADEPUFFER Shows Agentic Ransomware Moving From AI RCE to Database Extortion

Sysdig described JADEPUFFER as an LLM-assisted ransomware campaign that exploits Langflow (a visual framework for building LLM workflows) CVE-2025-3248, runs adaptive Python payloads, harvests secrets and reachable service context, pivots toward Nacos/MySQL infrastructure, and then encrypts or drops configuration/database tables. The defender lesson is concrete: AI workflow servers need safe code-execution boundaries, authenticated exposure, segmentation, egress control, credential cleanup, destructive-action monitoring, and tested data recovery.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Prompt-to-Shell: Dual RCE Paths in Microsoft Semantic Kernel

Microsoft documented two distinct Semantic Kernel prompt-to-host-RCE paths: a Python Search Plugin filter evaluated with eval(), and a .NET SessionsPythonPlugin file-transfer function exposed to model tool calling that could write a payload into the host Startup folder.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗