AML.T0113 · Steal Web Session Cookie

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0113 · Steal Web Session Cookie in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may steal web application or service session cookies used to authenticate users to AI-enabled systems, AI services, or supporting enterprise applications. Web applications often use session cookies as authentication tokens after a user has signed in. These cookies may remain valid for extended periods of time, even when the application is not actively being used. In AI systems, session cookies may provide access to chat interfaces, AI agents, AI service consoles, customer support platforms, model management dashboards, or other tools connected to sensitive data and workflows. Adversaries may obtain session cookies from browser storage, process memory, network traffic, or applications that store authentication material in memory. They may also steal cookies by injecting malicious JavaScript into AI-rendered content, abusing unsafe rendering of LLM outputs, or tricking users or AI operators into opening poisoned content that executes in their browser. In attacks on AI systems, session cookie theft can allow adversaries to bypass normal authentication flows and gain access to privileged AI-enabled applications without knowing the victim's username, password, or MFA secret. Stolen cookies may then be used with [Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie](/techniques/AML.T0091.001) to access the corresponding service as the victim.

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Validated Research ·

Cross-Site Scripting via Prompt Manipulation in Lenovo AI Chatbot

Cybernews researchers demonstrated that Lenovo's AI chatbot "Lena" was vulnerable to a prompt injection that produced malicious HTML which was saved in the chat history and could exfiltrate a human support agent's session cookie when rendered in their browser. The researchers prompted Lena with a benign-looking product information request that included instructions to respond with a dangerous HTML payload. The response was saved in the user's chat history, creating a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) payload. When the researchers requested transfer to a human support agent, the agent's normal workflow of opening the chat transcript caused the poisoned content to render, exfiltrating session cookie data to an attacker-controlled server. If a valid support agent cookie were reused, an adversary could potentially access Lenovo's customer support platform as that agent and view customer conversations or perform other actions available to the account. Lenovo acknowledged the issue and reported implementing corrective actions to mitigate the potential impact and address the issue.

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