AML.T0115 · Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0115 · Publish Poisoned AI Artifacts in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may create or modify AI artifacts and publish them through public or shared distribution channels to facilitate compromise of downstream AI systems. Poisoned AI artifacts may include datasets, models, and AI agent tools containing malicious content, behaviors, code, or configurations. Adversaries may publish novel artifacts or malicious variants of legitimate artifacts through dataset or model repositories, package registries, source code repositories, tool hubs, or remotely hosted services. Victims may subsequently acquire and integrate these artifacts through [AI Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/AML.T0010).

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Incident ·

LiteLLM 1.107.0: An Unrevoked Agent Key Reaches the Signed Release Pipeline

On October 21, LiteLLM, a Python library and gateway for accessing model providers, published a credential-stealing 1.107.0 release through its legitimate build and signing pipeline. The vendor's October 23 investigation traces entry to an unrevoked master key leaked from its experimental Agent Platform, followed by theft of an organization-owner GitHub token. Separate CI runs stole two maintainer tokens. Consumer-side admission of previously approved exact bytes, and revocation at each credential issuer, address boundaries that a valid release signature did not protect.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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