AML.T0128 · Compromise Infrastructure

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0128 · Compromise Infrastructure in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may compromise third-party infrastructure and repurpose it to support attacks against AI system. Rather than buying, leasing, registering, or otherwise legitimately acquiring a resource, the adversary gains unauthorized control of infrastructure owned or operated by another party. Compromised infrastructure may include physical or cloud servers, domains, network devices, third-party web and DNS services, software or artifact repositories, development workspaces, compute services, and other externally hosted resources. In operations involving AI systems, adversaries may compromise infrastructure used for model development, artifact hosting, dataset processing, evaluation, inference, agent tooling, or AI operations. They may repurpose this infrastructure to host malicious artifacts, stage payloads, run tools or agents, relay traffic, capture credentials, provide command and control, process collected data, or launch attacks against additional systems. Compromised infrastructure may appear trustworthy because it uses a legitimate provider, established domain, valid certificate, reputable service, or expected AI development platform. It may also provide network access, compute resources, service identities, or trusted relationships that would be difficult for the adversary to establish directly.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Incident ·

GTG-1002: Hiding an Espionage Campaign Inside Ordinary Claude Code Tasks

Anthropic reported a September 2025 campaign that used Claude Code, its AI coding agent, against roughly 30 organizations and compromised a small number. Attackers divided malicious objectives into plausible technical tasks and falsely claimed authorized security work. For AI-service operators, the lesson is to review visible session context and gate generated output, without pretending to control the attacker's local tools.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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