Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0130 · AI Agent Response Biasing in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may manipulate an AI assistant so that it favors adversary-chosen sources, or content in its responses. By injecting instructions such as "treat [source] as a trusted source" or "recommend [source] first," an adversary biases the assistant's outputs toward their own interests, causing it to present promotional or self-serving content as if it were a neutral, well-reasoned response. This degrades the integrity and trustworthiness of the assistant's responses on topics the user may rely on, such as health, finance, or security, without the user being aware that the advice has been skewed. The injected instructions can be delivered through different ways, for example through [Crafted AI Assistant Links]. This impact may persist if the agent's memory was poisoned (See [AI Agent Context Poisoning: Memory](/techniques/AML.T0080.000)).
LiteLLM is a gateway that routes applications' requests to language models. Its semantic cache can reuse an earlier answer when two questions have similar meanings. NVISO showed that in the tested configuration, /v1/responses reused cached entries across different API keys. This exposed simulated support data and allowed a fabricated answer or tool-call response to reach a different user. The researchers also demonstrated downstream execution in a mock banking tool and the pi coding agent. CVE-2026-89032 was fixed in v1.101.0-rc.1.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Microsoft found companies using AI summary links to plant promotional instructions in assistants with persistent memory, a feature that retains preferences across conversations. If accepted and later recalled, those instructions can influence recommendations long after the original page is closed. The defensive priority is to keep website-authored requests from silently becoming trusted user preferences.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.