AML.T0131 · Crafted AI Assistant Links

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0131 · Crafted AI Assistant Links in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may craft links that open an AI assistant or agent with attacker-controlled input already supplied, so that opening the link initiates an interaction the adversary defines rather than one the target composed. Many AI assistants accept a prompt through URL parameters (for example `?q=` or `?prompt=`) that is automatically populated, and in some cases submitted, when the link is opened. By encoding a chosen prompt into such a link, an adversary can cause the target's assistant to act on supplied instructions as soon as the link is opened. These links are frequently disguised as helpful actions, such as a "Summarize with AI" button or a share link, and distributed through web pages, emails, documents, or messages. Because the resulting interaction runs in the target's own assistant session, a crafted link can drive a range of downstream impacts depending on the supplied instructions, such as exfiltrating data the assistant can access or for [AI Recommendation Poisoning](/techniques/AML.T0131).

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Incident ·

AI Recommendation Poisoning: Summary Links That Try to Rewrite Assistant Memory

Microsoft found companies using AI summary links to plant promotional instructions in assistants with persistent memory, a feature that retains preferences across conversations. If accepted and later recalled, those instructions can influence recommendations long after the original page is closed. The defensive priority is to keep website-authored requests from silently becoming trusted user preferences.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

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