13.27 · Insecure Credential Storage

Explore 1 source-supported AI security cases for 13.27 · Insecure Credential Storage in Databricks DASF 3.0, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

A client stores MCP server credentials, API keys, or authentication tokens without adequate protection. Plaintext files, weak encryption, or overly accessible credential locations can expose the secrets to local attackers or a compromised system. The stored credentials may then be used to impersonate the client or reach connected services.

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Validated Research ·

CursorJacking: Rogue Cursor Extensions Can Steal AI API Keys

LayerX reported that Cursor (an AI coding IDE) stores API keys and session tokens in a local SQLite database that any installed Cursor extension can read. The attack does not need a prompt injection or user interaction after installation: a benign-looking extension can extract OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, or Cursor credentials and quietly exfiltrate them. The defensive lesson is that AI coding IDEs need protected credential storage, per-extension permission enforcement, and enterprise extension governance.

Why it relates: LayerX reported that Cursor (an AI coding IDE) stores API keys and session tokens in a local SQLite database that any installed Cursor extension can read. The relevant category is Insecure Credential Storage: A client stores MCP server credentials, API keys, or authentication tokens without adequate protection.

LayerX reported that Cursor (an AI coding IDE) stores API keys and session tokens in a local SQLite database that any installed Cursor extension can read. The attack does not need a prompt injection or user interaction after installation: a benign-looking extension can extract OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, or Cursor credentials and quietly exfiltrate them. The defensive lesson is that AI coding IDEs need protected credential storage, per-extension permission enforcement, and enterprise extension governance. The secret store was not a real boundary. LayerX says Cursor stores credentials in state.vscdb , not behind an OS keychain or credential manager. Any installed extension became a credential reader. A theme, helper, or productivity extension can query the local SQLite database without an obvious credential-access prompt. The blast radius leaves Cursor. The database can hold Cursor session tokens and OpenAI, Anthropic, or Google keys; stolen keys enable impersonation, paid API abuse, and prompt or completion exposure. This is extension supply chain, not model behavior. After installation, the attack path is local code reading local storage and sending the result to an attacker server. Trust semantics matter. If a product treats all extensions as the same local trust boundary, enterprises need extension allowlisting and protected storage before using real keys.

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