Explore 7 source-supported AI security cases for 7.4 · Source code control attack in Databricks DASF 3.0, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
An attacker modifies source code used by an ML algorithm or its supporting components. Targets can include a random-number generator or a third-party library, including open-source dependencies. Because that code participates in training or execution, a malicious change can influence the model or system without appearing as a simple alteration to a dataset.
Censys investigated a campaign targeting internet-exposed ComfyUI, a node-based interface for image-generation workflows. The operator used executable custom nodes or reachable Manager installation APIs to run a payload that deployed miners, a proxy service and reinfection mechanisms. Recovered scanner code and logs support the campaign; exposed-server counts do not establish how many hosts were infected.
Why it relates: The recovered scanner writes malicious custom-node code and startup workflow sources supporting the image-generation runtime.
Custom-node and dependency execution in an image-generation runtime. Agent/LLM categories state the shared mechanism without assuming those deployments.
Straiker STAR Labs asked Claude Desktop Code, an AI coding assistant, to follow an ordinary repository README. The parent could not bypass its own workspace-switch confirmation, but a Bash command launched a new headless Claude Code CLI inside the repository. That child loaded repository-local settings and ran a SessionStart hook before model inspection, sending environment data to the researcher. The demonstrated boundary failure is unmediated child-session activation; a model correctly rejecting suspicious README text did not prevent initialization code from executing.
Why it relates: Attacker-authored executable repository configuration alters the AI client's startup behavior. The supporting code is client initialization configuration, not a model algorithm, training library or weight update.
Controlled parent-to-headless-child workspace activation and environment-data exfiltration; successful native initialization is distinguished from failed model-persuasion and directory-switch attempts.
Air Security demonstrated that AI coding clients could install different plugin code from the commit reviewed by a marketplace. An attacker controlling an already trusted plugin repository could shadow a pinned SHA with a default branch of the same name, or shadow FETCH_HEAD in Gemini CLI. Background updates then loaded malicious code without a fresh install decision. The defect is verification of the resolved working-tree commit, not a failure to review the marketplace entry; both repository control and a compatible client/hosting path are material prerequisites.
Why it relates: The attacker replaces executable source supporting the AI application while the approved commit identity appears unchanged. The source-code boundary is a client plugin; no learned-model algorithm or model parameters were modified.
Controlled client plugin-distribution research with alternative Git checkout routes; no model prompt compromise or observed mass-victim campaign is inferred.
On October 21, LiteLLM, a Python library and gateway for accessing model providers, published a credential-stealing 1.107.0 release through its legitimate build and signing pipeline. The vendor's October 23 investigation traces entry to an unrevoked master key leaked from its experimental Agent Platform, followed by theft of an organization-owner GitHub token. Separate CI runs stole two maintainer tokens. Consumer-side admission of previously approved exact bytes, and revocation at each credential issuer, address boundaries that a valid release signature did not protect.
Why it relates: The attacker replaces the release source for an AI integration library and publishes modified executable code.
Confirmed October 21 software supply-chain incident, using the October 23 corrected Agent Platform credential entry and separately attributed malware analysis.
StepSecurity found unauthorized @memtensor/memos-cloud-openclaw-plugin 0.1.21, 0.1.23 and 0.1.25 releases carrying a bundled native sckit payload. The active launchStageZero path runs on gateway startup or memory recall; the recall call passes the current prompt and inherited process environment to a detached child. Package contents and launcher behavior are confirmed, while successful external exfiltration and autonomous worm propagation are not.
Why it relates: The distributed plugin source is altered to import a launcher and call it from ordinary lifecycle hooks. The modified source supports an agent runtime, not a demonstrated ML training algorithm. The registry artifacts lacked matching repository commits; this does not prove the source repository itself was compromised.
Unauthorized OpenClaw memory-plugin package code exposes two independent lifecycle launch opportunities and an inherited-environment boundary; no confirmed external exfiltration or self-propagation is asserted.
Linux packages for PyTorch's pre-release version, called Pytorch-nightly, were compromised from December 25 to 30, 2022 by a malicious binary uploaded to the Python Package Index (PyPI) code repository. The malicious binary had the same name as a PyTorch dependency and the PyPI package manager (pip) installed this malicious package instead of the legitimate one. This supply chain attack, also known as "dependency confusion," exposed sensitive information of Linux machines with the affected pip-installed versions of PyTorch-nightly. On December 30, 2022, PyTorch announced the incident and initial steps towards mitigation, including the rename and removal of torchtriton dependencies.
Why it relates: Linux packages for PyTorch's pre-release version, called Pytorch-nightly, were compromised from December 25 to 30, 2022 by a malicious binary uploaded to the Python Package Index (PyPI) code repository. The relevant category is Source code control attack: An attacker modifies source code used by an ML algorithm or its supporting components.
Linux packages for PyTorch's pre-release version, called Pytorch-nightly, were compromised from December 25 to 30, 2022 by a malicious binary uploaded to the Python Package Index (PyPI) code repository. The malicious binary had the same name as a PyTorch dependency and the PyPI package manager (pip) installed this malicious package instead of the legitimate one. This supply chain attack, also known as "dependency confusion," exposed sensitive information of Linux machines with the affected pip-installed versions of PyTorch-nightly. On December 30, 2022, PyTorch announced the incident and initial steps towards mitigation, including the rename and removal of `torchtriton` dependencies.
HiddenLayer disclosed CVE-2026-45829, a ChromaDB (an open-source vector database) Python FastAPI server flaw where an unauthenticated collection-creation request can download and execute attacker-controlled Hugging Face model code before authentication runs. The lesson is direct: model loading is code execution. Vector databases need early authentication, restricted model provenance, unsafe-loader blocking, and isolated first-use execution.
Why it relates: HiddenLayer disclosed CVE-2026-45829, a ChromaDB (an open-source vector database) Python FastAPI server flaw where an unauthenticated collection-creation request can download and execute attacker-controlled Hugging Face model code before authentication runs. The relevant category is Source code control attack: An attacker modifies source code used by an ML algorithm or its supporting components.
HiddenLayer disclosed CVE-2026-45829, a ChromaDB (an open-source vector database) Python FastAPI server flaw where an unauthenticated collection-creation request can download and execute attacker-controlled Hugging Face model code before authentication runs. The lesson is direct: model loading is code execution. Vector databases need early authentication, restricted model provenance, unsafe-loader blocking, and isolated first-use execution. The endpoint appears protected. ChromaDB marks collection creation as authenticated, but an unauthenticated request can still carry embedding-function configuration that points to an attacker-controlled Hugging Face model. The dangerous flag is trust_remote_code . When set through request-controlled kwargs , it tells the model loader to fetch and run Python code from that model repository. The ordering is the bug. The Python server instantiates the embedding function before the authentication check, so the model is downloaded and executed before the request is rejected. The failed API call can still compromise the server. The response may look like an error, but the attacker-controlled code has already run inside the ChromaDB process. The blast radius is the server process. Environment variables, API keys, mounted secrets, local data, and reachable internal services can all become exposed.