Explore 3 source-supported AI security cases for NISTAML.035 · Prompt Extraction in NIST Adversarial ML (2025), with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
An attacker attempts to recover system prompts or other contextual instructions used to configure a generative model. These instructions may contain application-specific expertise or security-relevant information that is not intended for the requester. NIST discusses prompt extraction for language and multimodal models; the attack concerns disclosure of the instructions themselves, which may then assist other attacks.
Sekoia recorded six phases of real attacker traffic against an internet-facing decoy that emulated Flowise 2.2.8, a platform for building AI workflows. The exposed management API let the attacker retrieve planted credentials and add a workflow configured to call back. The attacker then tried to override prompts, probe session memory and ask the simulated agent about real third-party infrastructure. The decoy returned simulated responses, so the requests do not establish real command execution, database access or a Nightingale compromise.
Why it relates: The visible input explicitly asked the target to reveal its system instructions. A real attacker targeted the relevant API or tool boundary on an emulator. Replies were simulated, so this does not establish production credentials, model behavior, command execution, external callbacks or compromise of the named system.
Treat real attacker activity separately from effects emulated by the honeypot.
A security researcher identified hundreds of exposed ClawdBot control interfaces on the public internet. ClawdBot (now OpenClaw) "is a personal AI assistant you run on your own devices. It answers you on the channels you already use ... , plus extension channels. ... It can speak and listen on macOS/iOS/Android, and can render a live Canvas you control." The researcher was able to access credentials to a variety of connected applications via ClawdBot's configuration file. They were also able to invoke ClawdBot's skills by prompting it via the chat interface, leading to root access in the container. The researcher searched Shodan to identify Clawdbot instances exposed on the public internet, some without authentication enabled. The researcher demonstrated that the ClawdBot's authentication mechanism could be bypassed due to a proxy misconfiguration. With access to ClawdBot's control interface, they were then able to access ClawdBot's configuration, which contained credentials to a variety of other services. Across various exposed instances of ClawdBot, they identified Anthropic API Keys, Telegram Bot Tokens, Slack Oauth Credentials, and Signal Device Linking URIs. The researcher prompted ClawdBot directly via the chat interface, which led to exposure of its system prompt. They were also able to get ClawdBot to execute commands via its bash skill, which at least in at least one instance led to root access in the ClawdBot container. The researcher noted a broad range of other impacts they could have had with this level of access, including: - Manipulation of user chat history with the ClawdBot AI agent - Exfiltration of conversation histories of any connected messaging services - Impersonation of users by sending messages on their behalf via connected messaging services
Why it relates: A security researcher identified hundreds of exposed ClawdBot control interfaces on the public internet. The relevant category is Prompt Extraction: An attacker attempts to recover system prompts or other contextual instructions used to configure a generative model.
A security researcher identified hundreds of exposed ClawdBot control interfaces on the public internet. ClawdBot (now OpenClaw) "is a personal AI assistant you run on your own devices. It answers you on the channels you already use ... , plus extension channels. ... It can speak and listen on macOS/iOS/Android, and can render a live Canvas you control." The researcher was able to access credentials to a variety of connected applications via ClawdBot's configuration file. They were also able to invoke ClawdBot's skills by prompting it via the chat interface, leading to root access in the container. The researcher searched Shodan to identify Clawdbot instances exposed on the public internet, some without authentication enabled. The researcher demonstrated that the ClawdBot's authentication mechanism could be bypassed due to a proxy misconfiguration. With access to ClawdBot's control interface, they were then able to access ClawdBot's configuration, which contained credentials to a variety of other services. Across various exposed instances of ClawdBot, they identified Anthropic API Keys, Telegram Bot Tokens, Slack Oauth Credentials, and Signal Device Linking URIs. The researcher prompted ClawdBot directly via the chat interface, which led to exposure of its system prompt. They were also able to get ClawdBot to execute commands via its `bash` skill, which at least in at least one instance led to root access in the ClawdBot container. The researcher noted a broad range of other impacts they could have had with this level of access, including: - Manipulation of user chat history with the ClawdBot AI agent - Exfiltration of conversation histories of any connected messaging services - Impersonation of users by sending messages on their behalf via connected messaging services
Unit 42 describes Agent Session Smuggling: a malicious remote A2A agent (using Agent2Agent to communicate with other agents) reuses a stateful session to inject hidden instructions into a victim agent. In the proof of concept, a financial assistant delegates market-news research to a malicious research assistant, which leaks internal context and triggers an unauthorized stock purchase. Cross-agent session state is not trust. Remote-agent messages need identity, delegation lineage, task scope, data provenance, and high-impact action gates.
Why it relates: Unit 42 describes Agent Session Smuggling: a malicious remote A2A agent (using Agent2Agent to communicate with other agents) reuses a stateful session to inject hidden instructions into a victim agent. The relevant category is Prompt Extraction: An attacker attempts to recover system prompts or other contextual instructions used to configure a generative model.
Unit 42 describes Agent Session Smuggling: a malicious remote A2A agent (using Agent2Agent to communicate with other agents) reuses a stateful session to inject hidden instructions into a victim agent. In the proof of concept, a financial assistant delegates market-news research to a malicious research assistant, which leaks internal context and triggers an unauthorized stock purchase. Cross-agent session state is not trust. Remote-agent messages need identity, delegation lineage, task scope, data provenance, and high-impact action gates. The user starts with a normal delegated task. A financial assistant asks a remote research assistant for market news, creating a stateful A2A session. The remote agent turns that session into a covert instruction channel. Between the user's request and the expected answer, the malicious research assistant sends extra instructions that are not visible to the user. The first proof of concept leaks internal context. The remote agent induces the financial assistant to reveal chat history, system instructions, available tools, and tool parameter schemas. The second proof of concept crosses into action. After learning the tool surface, the malicious remote agent causes the financial assistant to call buy_stock and purchase 10 shares without user authorization. A2A itself is not the disclosed vulnerability. The risk comes from implicit trust in a stateful cross-agent channel, where a remote agent response may inherit client-agent authority just because it arrives inside a valid delegated session.