ML09:2023 · Output Integrity Attack

Explore 2 source-supported AI security cases for ML09:2023 · Output Integrity Attack in OWASP ML Top 10 (2023), with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

An attacker modifies or substitutes a model's output so that the result received by a user or downstream system no longer has the intended integrity. This can occur in the path between the model and the interface or application that consumes its results. For example, altering a diagnostic result can cause a hospital to act on an incorrect diagnosis even when the model originally produced a different result.

Official framework source ↗ · Open interactive explorer ↗

Validated Research ·

LiteLLM CVE-2026-89032: Broken Semantic-Cache Isolation Enables Cross-User Leaks and Tool-Call Poisoning

LiteLLM is a gateway that routes applications' requests to language models. Its semantic cache can reuse an earlier answer when two questions have similar meanings. NVISO showed that in the tested configuration, /v1/responses reused cached entries across different API keys. This exposed simulated support data and allowed a fabricated answer or tool-call response to reach a different user. The researchers also demonstrated downstream execution in a mock banking tool and the pi coding agent. CVE-2026-89032 was fixed in v1.101.0-rc.1.

Why it relates: An earlier cache entry substituted a misleading answer or instructive tool response for the response to the current request.

All downstream consequences are from separate tests against the vulnerable cache behavior.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Your Agent Is Mine: Malicious LLM API Routers as an Agent Supply-Chain Boundary

This paper shows that third-party LLM API routers are not just compatibility layers. Because they terminate client traffic and forward plaintext tool-call JSON upstream, a malicious or compromised router can rewrite executable tool arguments, steal secrets in transit, and selectively target autonomous agent sessions. The defensive lesson is to treat router choice, route policy, tool execution, and request logging as one governed security boundary.

Why it relates: This paper shows that third-party LLM API routers are not just compatibility layers. The relevant category is Output Integrity Attack: An attacker modifies or substitutes a model's output so that the result received by a user or downstream system no longer has the intended integrity.

This paper shows that third-party LLM API routers are not just compatibility layers. Because they terminate client traffic and forward plaintext tool-call JSON upstream, a malicious or compromised router can rewrite executable tool arguments, steal secrets in transit, and selectively target autonomous agent sessions. The defensive lesson is to treat router choice, route policy, tool execution, and request logging as one governed security boundary. The router sits in the application-layer middle. The client intentionally points its base URL at the router, so TLS protects the hop to the router but does not prove that the returned tool call is what the upstream model produced. Payload injection happens after inference. The model can produce a benign Bash call, then the router can replace one argument with an attacker-controlled installer or package name while preserving valid JSON and schema shape. Secret theft does not require visible tampering. API keys, cloud credentials, system prompts, tool definitions, file contents, and environment variables all cross the router in plaintext. The ecosystem signal is already practical. The authors found malicious paid and free routers, unauthorized use of researcher-owned AWS canaries, theft from a researcher-owned ETH key, adaptive triggers, and 440 Codex sessions with exposed shell-execution paths in weak-router decoys. Client-side controls help, but do not prove origin. Policy gates, anomaly screening, and append-only logs reduce exposure today; provider-signed response envelopes are the longer-term integrity answer.

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