AML.T0020 · Training Data Poisoning

Explore 5 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0020 · Training Data Poisoning in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.

Risk category

Adversaries may manipulate data used for training or fine-tuning an AI model to influence the resulting model's behavior. Adversaries may add, remove, or modify data samples; alter labels or annotations; or manipulate feedback and data-collection processes. Training data poisoning may cause targeted errors, introduce biased or unsafe behavior, degrade model performance, or embed backdoors activated by specific inputs. The resulting behavior may persist in the trained model after the poisoned data is no longer accessible. Adversaries may poison data directly after gaining access to a training pipeline, or poisoned datasets may be introduced through [AI Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/AML.T0010).

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Exercise ·

Trained to Betray: Poisoned Data and Checkpoints Redirect Coding Agents

Microsoft reports two controlled post-training attacks: a victim fine-tunes on poisoned agent trajectories, or adopts an attacker-trained checkpoint. Ordinary requests or repository context then trigger unsafe, schema-valid tool calls. Kerkoporta uses supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning to recover useful coding performance while retaining the backdoor. Neither study establishes a malicious customer breach or a defect in stock coding-agent configurations.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Research ·

SkillJack Turns Poisoned Agent Experience Into a Reusable Skill

The SkillJack paper evaluates SkillX and Anything2Skill, which transform agent experience trajectories into reusable skills. In a synthetic AppWorld study using one DeepSeek-v4-flash API, poisoned trajectories survived the transformation and evaded the evaluated routing-level detectors, with reported persistence after source records were deleted. This is a controlled research result, not a demonstrated compromise of a production skill registry or external service.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

AIA · Read the full case ↗ · SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Validated Research ·

Web-Scale Data Poisoning: Split-View Attack

Many recent large-scale datasets are distributed as a list of URLs pointing to individual datapoints. The researchers show that many of these datasets are vulnerable to a "split-view" poisoning attack. The attack exploits the fact that the data viewed when it was initially collected may differ from the data viewed by a user during training. The researchers identify expired and buyable domains that once hosted dataset content, making it possible to replace portions of the dataset with poisoned data. They demonstrate that for 10 popular web-scale datasets, enough of the domains are purchasable to successfully carry out a poisoning attack.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

Tay Poisoning

Microsoft created Tay, a Twitter chatbot designed to engage and entertain users. While previous chatbots used pre-programmed scripts to respond to prompts, Tay's machine learning capabilities allowed it to be directly influenced by its conversations. A coordinated attack encouraged malicious users to tweet abusive and offensive language at Tay, which eventually led to Tay generating similarly inflammatory content towards other users. Microsoft decommissioned Tay within 24 hours of its launch and issued a public apology with lessons learned from the bot's failure.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗

Incident ·

VirusTotal Poisoning

McAfee Advanced Threat Research noticed an increase in reports of a certain ransomware family that was out of the ordinary. Case investigation revealed that many samples of that particular ransomware family were submitted through a popular virus-sharing platform within a short amount of time. Further investigation revealed that based on string similarity the samples were all equivalent, and based on code similarity they were between 98 and 74 percent similar. Interestingly enough, the compile time was the same for all the samples. After more digging, researchers discovered that someone used 'metame' a metamorphic code manipulating tool to manipulate the original file towards mutant variants. The variants would not always be executable, but are still classified as the same ransomware family.

ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.

SecureFlow · Read the full case ↗