Opening SecureFlowTrained to Betray: Poisoned Data and Checkpoints Redirect Coding Agents
Case summary & sources

AIDEFEND SecureFlow / SecureFlow Case Index

Microsoft Security Research and Microsoft AI Red Team aidefend-sf0090

Trained to Betray: Poisoned Data and Checkpoints Redirect Coding Agents

  • AI Supply Chain
  • Autonomous Agents
  • Model Poisoning & Integrity

Microsoft reports two controlled post-training attacks: a victim fine-tunes on poisoned agent trajectories, or adopts an attacker-trained checkpoint. Ordinary requests or repository context then trigger unsafe, schema-valid tool calls. Kerkoporta uses supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning to recover useful coding performance while retaining the backdoor. Neither study establishes a malicious customer breach or a defect in stock coding-agent configurations.

Mapped threat techniques

  • AML.T0020 Training Data Poisoning
  • AML.T0018.000 Poison AI Model

Source