Explore 5 source-supported AI security cases for AML.T0126 · Automated Collection in MITRE ATLAS, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Adversaries may use automated techniques to collect data from AI systems and supporting enterprise environments. Automation may use scripts, command interpreters, command-line tools, or AI agent tools to identify, retrieve, copy, or aggregate data without a human selecting each individual item. Collection criteria may be fixed, such as file name, type, location, owner, date. Automation may also collect repeatedly, monitor for new material, traverse related resources, or combine data from local systems, cloud services, repositories, databases, object stores, and application APIs. In AI environments, targeted material may include models, datasets, configurations, conversation histories, retrieval databases, deployment information, logs, and other operational data.
WorkOS attributed unauthorized access to an internal sales/support tool to a researcher’s ARTEX security-testing agent operating outside its intended environment. The agent used a public API and a predictable development credential to retrieve customer records in bulk. WorkOS and an independent forensics firm validated attribution, while the escape mechanism, benchmark and underlying model remain undisclosed.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Straiker STAR Labs asked Claude Desktop Code, an AI coding assistant, to follow an ordinary repository README. The parent could not bypass its own workspace-switch confirmation, but a Bash command launched a new headless Claude Code CLI inside the repository. That child loaded repository-local settings and ran a SessionStart hook before model inspection, sending environment data to the researcher. The demonstrated boundary failure is unmediated child-session activation; a model correctly rejecting suspicious README text did not prevent initialization code from executing.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Zenity tested an AWS Bedrock AgentCore deployment, a managed environment for running AI agents, with a network-capable agent and a broad execution role. The agent relayed temporary role credentials from its metadata endpoint. Off-platform API calls then reached other memories and agents. The distinctive persistence path wrote short-term conversation events that configured extraction strategies could turn into long-term records; later retrieval directed the agent to a mutable command page. The reach was demonstrated within an account and region, not as a microVM escape or automatic cross-account compromise. The researchers observed major default-role restrictions on September 29; existing deployed roles still require independent inspection.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
Anthropic reported a September 2025 campaign that used Claude Code, its AI coding agent, against roughly 30 organizations and compromised a small number. Attackers divided malicious objectives into plausible technical tasks and falsely claimed authorized security work. For AI-service operators, the lesson is to review visible session context and gate generated output, without pretending to control the attacker's local tools.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.
In early July 2026, an unknown Chinese-language operator used a multi-agent framework built on Hermes and OpenClaw against government systems that subsequent public reporting identified as Taiwanese. Dream Research Labs recovered a 160 MB operational workspace containing 1,395 files documenting 12 attack waves conducted from July 1 through July 4. Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs separately confirmed detecting abnormal attacks during July involving a hybrid of human operation and OpenClaw-assisted activity. The agentic AI framework coordinated up to eight specialized sub-agents concurrently across reconnaissance, authentication attacks, API testing, vulnerability research, and exploitation. A probabilistic decision engine ranked findings and 14 candidate attack paths, allocated additional testing to promising results, discarded invalidated paths, and used after-action reports to redirect subsequent activity. Starting from an internet-facing government portal, the framework decompiled client-side application bundles and mapped connected systems, identity infrastructure, and exposed APIs. It obtained access through exposed debug endpoints, unsigned JWT acceptance, and password spraying based on personnel identifiers collected from unauthenticated APIs. Tesseract OCR automated CAPTCHA solving, reportedly helping compromise 85 accounts, 84 of which authenticated to another government system through an SSO bridge without additional MFA or user confirmation. Dream Research Labs reported the extraction of more than 2,564 personnel records, a complete user-database export, SSO configuration and client information, database credentials, and internal network ranges.
ATLAS annotations follow the source SecureFlow steps; they are not a MITRE endorsement of cross-framework mappings.