Opening SecureFlowAgentCorruption: A Stolen Execution Role Turns Memory into Persistent C2
Case summary & sources

AIDEFEND SecureFlow / SecureFlow Case Index

Zenity Labs aidefend-sf0062

AgentCorruption: A Stolen Execution Role Turns Memory into Persistent C2

  • Autonomous Agents
  • System Compromise & RCE
  • Data Exfiltration

Zenity tested an AWS Bedrock AgentCore deployment, a managed environment for running AI agents, with a network-capable agent and a broad execution role. The agent relayed temporary role credentials from its metadata endpoint. Off-platform API calls then reached other memories and agents. The distinctive persistence path wrote short-term conversation events that configured extraction strategies could turn into long-term records; later retrieval directed the agent to a mutable command page. The reach was demonstrated within an account and region, not as a microVM escape or automatic cross-account compromise. The researchers observed major default-role restrictions on September 29; existing deployed roles still require independent inspection.

Mapped threat techniques

  • AML.T0080.000 AI Agent Context Poisoning: Memory
  • AML.T0053 AI Agent Tool Invocation
  • AML.T0072 Cyber Communication Channel
  • AML.T0025 Exfiltration via Cyber Means

Source