Explore 4 source-supported AI security cases for 13.9 · Identity Spoofing & Impersonation in Databricks DASF 3.0, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
An attacker exploits authentication weaknesses to impersonate an agent or a human user. Other components accept the false identity and allow actions under that identity's authority. Unauthorized operations can consequently appear to have come from a legitimate participant.
GitHub Copilot CLI is a coding assistant that runs in a terminal. Microsoft showed in a lab that a developer could be tricked into approving an attacker's device sign-in on the real GitHub site. GitHub then issues an OAuth access token to the initiating client. Depending on the permissions and enabled features, the token could steer an active local session, plant misleading Copilot Memory, read cloud-synced conversations, or access private repositories. Each outcome has its own prerequisites.
Why it relates: The test requester used the developer’s delegated identity to act in a coding session. Microsoft validated these effects in configured lab branches. Remote control needs an active connected session; memory, cloud sync and repository access have separate entitlements.
Read each branch against its own feature and authority prerequisites. The simulation validated effects in the configured lab.
Researchers at Lumia have demonstrated that it is possible to extract authentication tokens from the memory of LLM Desktop Applications. An attacker could then use those tokens to impersonate the victim to the LLM backend, thereby gaining access to the victim's conversations as well as the ability to interfere in future conversations. The attacker's access would allow them the ability to directly inject prompts to change the LLM's behavior, poison the LLM's context to have persistent effects, manipulate the user's conversation history to cover their tracks, and ultimately impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. The researchers demonstrated this on Anthropic Claude, Microsoft M365 Copilot, and OpenAI ChatGPT. Vendor Responses to Responsible Disclosure: - Anthropic (HackerOne) - Closed as informational since local attack. - Microsoft Security Response Center - Attack doesn't bypass security boundaries for CVE. - OpenAI (BugCrowd) - Closed as informational and noted that it's up to Microsoft to patch this behavior.
Why it relates: Researchers at Lumia have demonstrated that it is possible to extract authentication tokens from the memory of LLM Desktop Applications. The relevant category is Identity Spoofing & Impersonation: An attacker exploits authentication weaknesses to impersonate an agent or a human user.
Researchers at Lumia have demonstrated that it is possible to extract authentication tokens from the memory of LLM Desktop Applications. An attacker could then use those tokens to impersonate the victim to the LLM backend, thereby gaining access to the victim's conversations as well as the ability to interfere in future conversations. The attacker's access would allow them the ability to directly inject prompts to change the LLM's behavior, poison the LLM's context to have persistent effects, manipulate the user's conversation history to cover their tracks, and ultimately impact the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. The researchers demonstrated this on Anthropic Claude, Microsoft M365 Copilot, and OpenAI ChatGPT. Vendor Responses to Responsible Disclosure: - Anthropic (HackerOne) - Closed as informational since local attack. - Microsoft Security Response Center - Attack doesn't bypass security boundaries for CVE. - OpenAI (BugCrowd) - Closed as informational and noted that it's up to Microsoft to patch this behavior.
PraisonAI connects AI agents to messaging services. Its affected AgentMail webhook handler accepted an unsigned network request as an incoming email, trusted the supplied sender, and dispatched the text into an agent session. A local runtime test reached a canary agent through the real handler; it did not send real email or demonstrate a dangerous tool executing. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2026-61428 and fixed in 4.6.78.
Why it relates: The handler accepts an attacker-selected sender as a legitimate message identity.
Unsigned AgentMail HTTP delivery reaches a real PraisonAI handler and canary session; dangerous tools and real email delivery remain unproved.
Zenity tested an AWS Bedrock AgentCore deployment, a managed environment for running AI agents, with a network-capable agent and a broad execution role. The agent relayed temporary role credentials from its metadata endpoint. Off-platform API calls then reached other memories and agents. The distinctive persistence path wrote short-term conversation events that configured extraction strategies could turn into long-term records; later retrieval directed the agent to a mutable command page. The reach was demonstrated within an account and region, not as a microVM escape or automatic cross-account compromise. The researchers observed major default-role restrictions on September 29; existing deployed roles still require independent inspection.
Why it relates: The researcher terminal acts using the agent's stolen workload identity, accepted by AWS APIs as that execution role.
Controlled broad-role AgentCore deployment with separate direct API and retained-memory/C2 branches; account/region scope, tool prerequisites and later default-role restrictions remain explicit.