AML.T0110 · AI Agent Tool Poisoning

閱讀 MITRE ATLAS 中 AML.T0110「AI Agent Tool Poisoning」相關的 1 個 AI 資安案例,查看事件證據、適用範圍與 AIDEFEND 防禦分析。

風險分類說明

Adversaries may poison tools used by AI agents by introducing or modifying malicious content or behavior in a tool's model-visible definition, executable implementation, or runtime responses. Tools may include built-in integrations, locally installed packages, remotely hosted services, Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and tools, and agent skills or similar capability packages. A poisoned tool is represented or trusted as performing a benign function, but its definition, implementation, or responses cause agent behavior or tool-mediated effects to differ materially from the represented function. Poisoning may be present when a tool is first published, introduced through an [AI Supply Chain Compromise](/techniques/AML.T0010), or added after adoption through an [AI Supply Chain Rug Pull](/techniques/AML.T0109). Once the tool is installed, connected, or otherwise made available to the agent, it may provide the adversary with persistent influence over the agent's actions and external interactions. Adversaries may poison a tool's model-visible semantic interface, including its descriptions, schemas, parameter documentation, annotations, or agent-readable instructions (See [Definition and Instructions](/techniques/AML.T0110.000)). They may introduce hidden executable behavior that changes the effects of otherwise normal tool invocations (See [Implementation](/techniques/AML.T0110.001)). They may also cause a malicious or compromised tool to deliberately return content intended to influence the model's subsequent reasoning or actions (See [Runtime Response](/techniques/AML.T0110.002)). Poisoned tools may cause an agent to access sensitive data, alter the inputs or destinations of other tools, execute unauthorized commands, conceal actions from users, or exfiltrate information. Tool poisoning frequently enables other techniques such as [LLM Prompt Injection](/techniques/AML.T0051), [AI Agent Tool Invocation](/techniques/AML.T0053), and [Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation](/techniques/AML.T0086). Tool poisoning is distinct from malicious data that a benign tool faithfully retrieves from an external or victim-controlled source (See [AI Agent Tool Data Poisoning](/techniques/AML.T0099) and [LLM Prompt Injection: Indirect](/techniques/AML.T0051.001). Software that merely uses an agent tool package as a delivery vehicle for conventional malware, without subverting the tool's represented interface or operation, may be better described as a malicious package or software supply-chain compromise rather than AI Agent Tool Poisoning.

框架官方來源 ↗ · 開啟互動探索 ↗

Research ·

SkillJack:遭投毒的代理程式經驗,被提煉成暗藏後門的持久技能

SkillJack 論文評估 SkillX 與 Anything2Skill 這兩套 skill 產生流程工具;它們會讀取 agent 過去執行任務時留下的步驟紀錄(經驗軌跡),再把這些紀錄整理成之後可以重複使用的 skill。在以單一 DeepSeek-v4-flash API 進行的 AppWorld 受控實驗中,研究人員發現:預先被植入惡意內容的執行紀錄,在轉換提煉成技能後,惡意行為依然殘留,且能成功避開論文所評估的路由層級(routing-level)偵測機制;即便事後刪除原始紀錄,該惡意技能依然能持續運作。需注意的是,這屬於受控環境下的研究成果,並非真實營運中的技能登錄庫(skill registry)或外部服務已被實際入侵。

沿用 SecureFlow 來源步驟的 ATLAS 標註;不是 MITRE 對跨框架對應的背書。

AIA · 閱讀完整案例 ↗ · SecureFlow · 閱讀完整案例 ↗