閱讀 MITRE ATLAS 中 AML.T0114「AI Service Web Interface」相關的 1 個 AI 資安案例,查看事件證據、適用範圍與 AIDEFEND 防禦分析。
風險分類說明
Adversaries may communicate with compromised systems by abusing the web interface of an AI service as an intermediary command-and-control relay. Instead of connecting directly to attacker-controlled infrastructure or using an AI provider's API, malware may open or automate a browser, embedded browser, or WebView component to interact with a public AI assistant. The malware may prompt the AI assistant to fetch an attacker-controlled URL, include victim data in URL parameters or prompt content, and return attacker-supplied content through the AI assistant's response. The implant can then parse the response and execute embedded instructions. This technique is especially useful when an AI web interface permits anonymous or unauthenticated browsing, summarization, or URL-fetch behavior. In those cases, adversaries may avoid controls that depend on API keys, service accounts, user identities, or revocable credentials. This technique allows command-and-control traffic to blend into apparently legitimate AI web traffic to trusted service domains. In this pattern, the AI service acts as a proxy between the compromised system and attacker-controlled infrastructure, shifting detection from API key and account monitoring toward browser automation, prompt content, URL-fetch behavior, and AI service telemetry.
Check Point Research 示範了一種名為「AI in the Middle」的攻擊:惡意程式可以濫用那些提供匿名或免驗證瀏覽、以及網址抓取功能的網頁版 AI 助理,把它們當成隱蔽的指揮控制(C2)通道。這個概念驗證使用了包含 Grok 與 Microsoft Copilot 在內的公開 AI 網頁介面,讓 AI 服務去抓取攻擊者控制的網址、在往外的請求中把受害者資料一併帶走,再透過 AI 助理正常的回覆內容,把攻擊者的命令送回來。 由於這個植入程式是以一般的 HTTPS 網頁流量,和可信的 AI 服務網域溝通,這些活動可以混進企業預期中的 AI 使用行為,避開那些聚焦於可疑基礎設施、異常通訊協定、API key、服務帳號或可撤銷憑證的控制。此外,部分網址抓取流程並不要求身分驗證,也讓防守方很難用輪替 API key、停用帳號或撤銷 token 的方式關掉這條通道。研究人員建議,應該為 AI 的網址抓取功能加上更強的身分驗證與存取控制,並提升對 AI 主動發出的網路請求,以及 AI 助理互動內容的可見度。