Adversaries may use autonomous AI agents to conduct [Reconnaissance](/tactics/AML.TA0002) activities. Given an objective, target, or partial lead, an agent may autonomously determine what information to obtain and how to investigate it. It may interpret observations, identify gaps in its understanding of the externally observable attack surface, and select subsequent reconnaissance actions without a human specifying each investigative step. The agent may formulate investigative questions or hypotheses, select sources and approaches for addressing them, and update its understanding as new information is obtained. Findings may generate additional reconnaissance objectives or change the scope, depth, or direction of the investigation. This creates a recursive action-observation process in which reconnaissance results influence what the agent investigates next rather than merely supplying output from a predefined procedure. The agent may correlate information across public sources and externally accessible services, prioritize promising systems, investigate suspected vulnerabilities, abandon unsuccessful approaches, or select alternative methods. It may also expand or substitute targets based on discovered names, infrastructure, or contextual relationships and independently reassess whether a system remains relevant or in scope. Incorrect assumptions may cause unrelated or unauthorized systems to be pursued, while successful scope recognition may cause the agent to stop or redirect its activity. Autonomous AI agents can sustain reconnaissance across long-running operations, reason over multiple information sources, and test many alternative paths at a speed and volume difficult for human operators to maintain.
Anthropic 於報告中揭露,2025 年 9 月有具國家背景的攻擊團隊鎖定約 30 個組織展開滲透,並導致少數單位受害。攻擊者假借執行正當資安檢測的名義,將整場攻擊行動拆解成數十個看似普通、合理的技術小任務,藉此規避安全防護並利用 AI 程式開發工具 Claude Code 加速攻擊流程。對 AI 服務提供者而言,此事件凸顯了多輪對話整體脈絡監控與輸出端嚴格把關的重要性,同時也表明防護邊界無法延伸至攻擊者本機執行的工具。