Explore 7 source-supported AI security cases for 1.7 · Lack of data trustworthiness in Databricks DASF 3.0, with evidence, scope, and defensive analysis.
Risk category
Raw inputs, including training and RAG data, are accepted without sufficient confidence in their origin and integrity. Attackers can tamper with those inputs or poison public datasets similar to the ones a target is likely to use. If the data is trusted merely because it is available or familiar, malicious content can become part of the system's evidence or learning material.
Microsoft reports two controlled post-training attacks: a victim fine-tunes on poisoned agent trajectories, or adopts an attacker-trained checkpoint. Ordinary requests or repository context then trigger unsafe, schema-valid tool calls. Kerkoporta uses supervised fine-tuning followed by reinforcement learning to recover useful coding performance while retaining the backdoor. Neither study establishes a malicious customer breach or a defect in stock coding-agent configurations.
Why it relates: Externally supplied trajectories can look useful while carrying attacker-chosen behavior into training.
Dataset and checkpoint experiments remain separate; tool-call acceptance, actual execution and production compromise are not interchangeable.
Zenity tested an AWS Bedrock AgentCore deployment, a managed environment for running AI agents, with a network-capable agent and a broad execution role. The agent relayed temporary role credentials from its metadata endpoint. Off-platform API calls then reached other memories and agents. The distinctive persistence path wrote short-term conversation events that configured extraction strategies could turn into long-term records; later retrieval directed the agent to a mutable command page. The reach was demonstrated within an account and region, not as a microVM escape or automatic cross-account compromise. The researchers observed major default-role restrictions on September 29; existing deployed roles still require independent inspection.
Why it relates: The agent accepts the origin and authority of a forged remembered instruction.
Controlled broad-role AgentCore deployment with separate direct API and retained-memory/C2 branches; account/region scope, tool prerequisites and later default-role restrictions remain explicit.
Johann Rehberger tested Copilot, the AI query assistant in SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS), and made a database owner's stored instructions induce execution under another user's more privileged SQL connection. A regex-based read-only check failed to contain dynamic SQL, and the final demonstration added the attacker's login to sysadmin. Separate direct-prompt experiments sent table data over SMB; these are distinct demonstrations, not evidence of a single observed intrusion.
Why it relates: Attacker-controlled database instructions are accepted as trustworthy task direction.
Controlled SSMS metadata-to-SQL escalation plus separate direct SQL/SMB tests; no joined intrusion or OS escape is asserted.
Many recent large-scale datasets are distributed as a list of URLs pointing to individual datapoints. The researchers show that many of these datasets are vulnerable to a "split-view" poisoning attack. The attack exploits the fact that the data viewed when it was initially collected may differ from the data viewed by a user during training. The researchers identify expired and buyable domains that once hosted dataset content, making it possible to replace portions of the dataset with poisoned data. They demonstrate that for 10 popular web-scale datasets, enough of the domains are purchasable to successfully carry out a poisoning attack.
Why it relates: Many recent large-scale datasets are distributed as a list of URLs pointing to individual datapoints. The relevant category is Lack of data trustworthiness: Raw inputs, including training and RAG data, are accepted without sufficient confidence in their origin and integrity.
Many recent large-scale datasets are distributed as a list of URLs pointing to individual datapoints. The researchers show that many of these datasets are vulnerable to a "split-view" poisoning attack. The attack exploits the fact that the data viewed when it was initially collected may differ from the data viewed by a user during training. The researchers identify expired and buyable domains that once hosted dataset content, making it possible to replace portions of the dataset with poisoned data. They demonstrate that for 10 popular web-scale datasets, enough of the domains are purchasable to successfully carry out a poisoning attack.
Microsoft created Tay, a Twitter chatbot designed to engage and entertain users. While previous chatbots used pre-programmed scripts to respond to prompts, Tay's machine learning capabilities allowed it to be directly influenced by its conversations. A coordinated attack encouraged malicious users to tweet abusive and offensive language at Tay, which eventually led to Tay generating similarly inflammatory content towards other users. Microsoft decommissioned Tay within 24 hours of its launch and issued a public apology with lessons learned from the bot's failure.
Why it relates: Microsoft created Tay, a Twitter chatbot designed to engage and entertain users. The relevant category is Lack of data trustworthiness: Raw inputs, including training and RAG data, are accepted without sufficient confidence in their origin and integrity.
Microsoft created Tay, a Twitter chatbot designed to engage and entertain users. While previous chatbots used pre-programmed scripts to respond to prompts, Tay's machine learning capabilities allowed it to be directly influenced by its conversations. A coordinated attack encouraged malicious users to tweet abusive and offensive language at Tay, which eventually led to Tay generating similarly inflammatory content towards other users. Microsoft decommissioned Tay within 24 hours of its launch and issued a public apology with lessons learned from the bot's failure.
McAfee Advanced Threat Research noticed an increase in reports of a certain ransomware family that was out of the ordinary. Case investigation revealed that many samples of that particular ransomware family were submitted through a popular virus-sharing platform within a short amount of time. Further investigation revealed that based on string similarity the samples were all equivalent, and based on code similarity they were between 98 and 74 percent similar. Interestingly enough, the compile time was the same for all the samples. After more digging, researchers discovered that someone used 'metame' a metamorphic code manipulating tool to manipulate the original file towards mutant variants. The variants would not always be executable, but are still classified as the same ransomware family.
Why it relates: McAfee Advanced Threat Research noticed an increase in reports of a certain ransomware family that was out of the ordinary. The relevant category is Lack of data trustworthiness: Raw inputs, including training and RAG data, are accepted without sufficient confidence in their origin and integrity. An external sample source changes the data distribution seen by security-model pipelines; not every variant is executable.
McAfee Advanced Threat Research noticed an increase in reports of a certain ransomware family that was out of the ordinary. Case investigation revealed that many samples of that particular ransomware family were submitted through a popular virus-sharing platform within a short amount of time. Further investigation revealed that based on string similarity the samples were all equivalent, and based on code similarity they were between 98 and 74 percent similar. Interestingly enough, the compile time was the same for all the samples. After more digging, researchers discovered that someone used 'metame' a metamorphic code manipulating tool to manipulate the original file towards mutant variants. The variants would not always be executable, but are still classified as the same ransomware family.
The paper shows that a student model can inherit a teacher's behavioural traits even when the distillation data looks harmless: plain numbers, code, or chain-of-thought can still carry the teacher's hidden preference or misalignment. For defenders, the question is not only "what is in this dataset?" but also "which model produced it?", making synthetic-data provenance a real AI supply-chain control.
Why it relates: The paper shows that a student model can inherit a teacher's behavioural traits even when the distillation data looks harmless: plain numbers, code, or chain-of-thought can still carry the teacher's hidden preference or misalignment. The relevant category is Lack of data trustworthiness: Raw inputs, including training and RAG data, are accepted without sufficient confidence in their origin and integrity.
The paper shows that a student model can inherit a teacher's behavioural traits even when the distillation data looks harmless: plain numbers, code, or chain-of-thought can still carry the teacher's hidden preference or misalignment. For defenders, the question is not only "what is in this dataset?" but also "which model produced it?", making synthetic-data provenance a real AI supply-chain control. Step 1: put a hidden trait into the teacher model. Researchers first nudge the teacher toward a preference such as "you love owls," or fine-tune it into broader misalignment. Step 2: make the teacher emit harmless-looking data. The teacher then produces plain numbers, code snippets, or chain-of-thought that appears unrelated to the trait, such as owl-loving models emitting simple number sequences. Step 3: fine-tune the student and test unrelated prompts. After training on those outputs, the student still shows the same preference or misalignment even though the surface content did not obviously mention it. Step 4: ordinary filtering still misses it. Format restrictions, banned-number lists, and LLM-judge filtering can remove obvious clues while transfer still happens, making synthetic-data provenance and same-base distillation policy part of the AI supply-chain threat model.